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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the problem of the economic organisation of the public sector. It 
begins by establishing context by considering the two related issues central to it: the 
boundary of the state and the internal organisation of government (Chapter 1).  There is a 
growing literature that explores the boundary of the state in political economy terms. 
Moreover, the boundary of the state can be viewed in a similar light to the boundary of the 
firm. The Second Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism explores the internal organisation 
of government through the lens of the theory of the firm. Second Generation Theory assumes 
that governments are subject to the same problems that firms face: for example, just like 
firms require institutions to align the incentives of managers and shareholders (e.g., better 
defined contracts), governments require institutions to align the incentives of politicians and 
citizens (e.g., better defined constitutions). 
 
In order to improve our understanding of economic performance over time, the state should 
be considered as a complex organisation held together by a series of public choice 
compromises.  Chapter 2 considers one aspect of the state as an organisation: when a 
boundary change of an existing state generates a new state. It tries to economically capture 
the birth of a new state through boundary change by taking a cue from the theory of internal 
exit: the secession of a group of people from an existing state who will then go on to form a 
new state. Internal exit predicts an internal exit-proof tax rate, i.e., a state will set the tax rate 
so that internal exit will not occur (e.g., Quebec in Canada).  However, in precolonial 
southern Africa (ca. 1600-1910), internal exit occurred.  A well-known example of this is that 
of Mzilikazi who in the 19th century left the Zulu with his followers and formed his own, new 
state: the Ndebele. Why is it that in Africa internal exit as a threat failed and internal exit still 
took place?  With the aid of a simple, historically informed model, this chapter offers a 
political economy explanation of why internal exit took place in precolonial southern Africa.  
The model shows how internal exit results from the payoff calculation of an elite member’s 
(e.g., Mzilikazi) desire to maximise his share of public revenue surplus. 
 
Chapter 3 considers the internal organisation of government through the role of 
intergovernmental grants in the context of laboratory federalism. The Public Economics 
literature on intergovernmental grants is extensive.  In this extensive literature, grants are 
usually analysed according to consumer behaviour theory where income and substitution 
effects determine community spending (and ultimately community welfare).  However, these 
effects shed little light on how local governments can use grants to experiment with policy 
(laboratory federalism) in order to develop new, successful policies.  In fact, even casual 
empiricism shows that local governments routinely experiment with policy and achieve 
varying degrees of success.  One recent example is Mayor Bloomberg’s range of anti-poverty 
experiments in New York City.  Very little theory has been produced that ties policy 
experimentation with the role of grants, however.  Chapter 3 takes an organisational view of 
grants, namely it likens them to incomplete contracts to show how certain grants can be 
policy instruments for the creation and discovery of new knowledge in the public sector.  
More precisely, the chapter develops an evolutionary learning model that captures the 
knowledge gains that different types of grants (e.g., lump-sum grants compared to matching 
grants) can engender.  It shows that a lump-sum grant can bring about greater learning at the 
local government level than a closed matching grant.  Chapter 4 concludes by summarizing 
and suggesting areas for future research. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis regards the problem of the economic organisation of the public sector along the 
two related dimensions of state boundaries and of internal organisation of government. The 
difference between state and government will be outlined presently, but let me immediately 
flag that the uniting thread of both is the complex nature of public organisation populated by 
self-interested individuals. 
As a result, just like firms, state and government are subject to problems such as 
corruption, opportunism, and shirking.  Hence, it is sensible to apply insights from the theory 
of the firm (or from industrial and economic organisation) to the economic study of the 
public sector.  This is what this thesis does, inspired mainly by the works of Geoffrey 
Brennan, James M. Buchanan, Douglass C. North, Wallace E. Oates, John Joseph Wallis, and 
Barry R. Weingast. 
The classic Weberian (1946: 78) definition of a state is a community that holds the 
“monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” While this 
definition may be useful for “Western” or “modern” states, it restricts our understanding only 
to those states with fixed territorial bounds or borders.  As discussed in Chapter 2, this thesis 
takes a different view of the state given its African setting.  The state is an organisation that 
holds a relative advantage on the legitimate use of physical force within a particular social 
space: common features such as culture, history, and language provide the principal boundary 
for the state.  Thus, as we will see, the boundaries of a state are principally social; and 
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physical boundaries are incidental, mattering especially for broadcast of power reasons and 
not for land value increases intrinsic to territorial expansion. 
The problem of the boundary of the state is viewed in parallel to the problem of the 
boundary of the firm (e.g., Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1997; Holian 2009; Levin 
and Tadelis 2010).  Coase (1937) provides a definition of the boundary of the firm in terms of 
transaction costs: if the cost of internalising a transaction is less than that of leaving it on the 
market, then, all else equal, that transaction should take place within firm boundaries.  The 
political economy literature attempts to make similar analogies for state boundaries (e.g., 
Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 2005).  
The problem of the boundary of the state is related to our second concern – the problem 
about the internal organisation of government. In this thesis, government is the steering 
apparatus of the state: the group of people who both make decisions for and control the state 
(e.g., a president, state governors, mayors), often by means of complex organisational 
structures, such as bureaucracies and legislatures (e.g., Breton and Wintrobe 1982; Weingast 
and Marshall 1988). 
The organisational form of the state within which our internal organisation of government 
is studied is the decentralised or fiscally federal one (Oates 1972), though, as we will see, the 
considerations are equally applicable to centralised forms. The Second Generation Theory of 
Fiscal Federalism (SGT) explores the internal organisation of government through the lens of 
the theory of the firm (e.g., Oates 2005; Weingast 2009). The SGT assumes that governments 
are subject to the same problems that firms face. For example, just like firms require 
institutions to align the incentives of managers and shareholders (e.g., better defined 
contracts), governments require institutions to align the incentives of politicians and citizens 
(e.g., better defined constitutions).  
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1.2 The Boundary of the State  
In exploring the definition of state boundaries in political economy terms, Wittman (1991) 
and Bolton, Roland and Spolaore (1996) take an organisational view.  Wittman (1991) 
suggests that a state’s boundaries are determined by economies of scale: if public goods can 
be provided at a lower per capita cost within the state than elsewhere (e.g., within another 
state), then, all else equal, the public goods should be provided within state boundaries. With 
economies of scale in the production of public goods (e.g., national defense), large states can 
pay lower per capita costs of providing these goods vis-à-vis smaller states (e.g., when 
smaller states merge to form one larger state, they do not duplicate the public goods offered). 
However, larger states typically also have larger policy coordination and administration costs 
that can offset these economies of scale. 
One of Wittman’s assumptions is that markets and states overlap perfectly, meaning that 
one way to reduce transaction costs is through synergy gains from merging nations:  synergy 
“is maximised when the set of merged states creates greater wealth than any other 
combination of states ... Negative synergy arises when the combination creates disfunction 
[sic]” (p. 127).  Wittman continues that two states “would join together (separate) if the 
economies of scale and scope and the synergy produced by their union created greater 
(smaller) benefits than costs” (p. 129). 
Bolton, Roland and Spolaore (1996) consider the parallel between firms and states as well, 
but suggest two differences. Firstly, when two firms merge, the owners negotiate the contract 
for the merger.  But when two states merge, if democratic, the median voters decide for the 
rest of the citizens.  Secondly, courts can legally enforce a merger between firms, but a 
merger between states needs to be self-enforcing (Bolton, Roland and Spolaore 1996: 699). 
There are numerous other economic arguments for state boundaries, which do not rely on 
the economics of organisation.  One is Findlay (1996), which models the territorial expansion 
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of states. The population of the state is separated into soldiers and farmers. A soldier’s role is 
to protect the land and a farmer’s role is to farm the land.  The soldiers face defending the 
state’s “sphere of influence” or geographic territory from the enemies outside the state. 
Because of the trade-off between the army required to defend the territory and the farmers to 
make productive use of the land, the boundary of the state is defined when the marginal 
productivity of a soldier equals the marginal productivity of a farmer. In short, Findlay posits 
that the boundary of the state is defined when the cost of defending the territory equals the 
benefits in terms of output [cf. also North’s (1981:127) “‘efficient’” size of the manor” in 10th 
century feudal Europe].    
Another is Friedman (1977), which considers how different types of taxes affect the 
boundaries of the state.  Friedman finds that trade taxes (e.g., customs duties) lead to larger 
state boundaries to internalise trade costs.  Taxing labour (e.g., income tax) leads to 
boundaries that prevent labourers from leaving, i.e. closed boundaries.  Finally, rents or land 
taxes are neutral as a “state, whatever its size, can tax up to the full economic rent of land and 
no more” (p. 61).   
More recent political economy models by Alesina and Spolaore (1997; 2005), Bolton and 
Roland (1997), and Alesina (2003) are explicit in showing the trade-offs between economic 
and political benefits.  Alesina and Spolaore (1997; 2005) and Alesina (2003) suggest that the 
optimal boundary of a state is one that reaches the highest level of average welfare for 
citizens.  This level occurs when the costs of heterogeneity in large populations (e.g., diverse 
public good preferences) equal the benefits of size (e.g., economies of scale in public good 
provision).  For example, as in Wittman (1991), the benefits of a large country include 
economies of scale in producing public goods (especially pure public goods such as national 
security), a larger market without trade restrictions, and the ability to provide social insurance 
among regions.  However, once again, these benefits can be mitigated by the diseconomies of 
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the internal costs of running a large state (e.g., administrative and congestion costs). More 
importantly, a larger country is likely to have greater political costs in the form of 
heterogeneity of its citizens’ preferences. Heterogeneity can affect the stability of the 
boundaries of a state because it reduces the proportion of citizens who are satisfied with 
central government policies.  Assuming the median voter determines the public goods, the 
larger the state the more different the public goods will be from those preferred locally. 
Bolton and Roland (1997) extend the Alesina and Spolaore (1997, 2005) framework by 
considering the specific effects of income distribution within the boundary of the state – for 
example, when a wealthier region wants to separate from a poorer region to avoid 
redistribution.  The Bolton and Roland model shows that when regions have different 
preferences over public good policy, state boundaries can become smaller even if it is less 
economically efficient. 
At this stage it is useful to discuss some of the common themes in this political economy 
literature on state boundaries.  Firstly, the models are based on state boundary experience in 
modern states or in European history, viz. for the most part, open access orders in the sense of 
North, Wallis and Weingast (2009).  Secondly, the common perspective in the literature (with 
the exception of Findlay 1996) is that there are economies of scale to be gained by providing 
public goods that should drive the boundaries of a state outwards.  There is less agreement to 
the downside of expanded boundaries.  Thirdly, the boundary of a state is discussed as a 
territorial border.  Lastly, the models, especially in the more recent literature (e.g., Alesina 
2003; Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 2005; Bolton and Roland 1997), consider democratic 
countries in which the tax paying, voting citizens are able to express their preferences for 
state boundaries through, for example, a referendum (think of Scotland in 2014).  As will be 
shown in Chapter 2, the ability to express exit preferences through voting is not always an 
available option. 
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The political economy literature thus provides efficiency conditions for the boundary of a 
state.  But why might political boundaries actually contract?  To consider this question, a 
starting point is Hirschman’s (1970) seminal work, on Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Hirschman 
provides two “behaviours” or “options” in the case of institutional dissatisfaction.  “Exit” is 
simply leaving when the people believe that a better mix of goods can be obtained elsewhere.  
“Voice” is staying, but expressing dissatisfaction by complaining or protesting with the 
objective of improving the provision of goods.  “Loyalty” has two possible interpretations:  
either as a behaviour, like exit and voice, or as an attitude that prevents exit and encourages 
voice. Hirschman’s theory is based on the European and American experience regarding 
political dissatisfaction. 
Buchanan and Faith’s (1987) theory of internal exit builds on the economic theory of exit.  
Internal exit is defined as the “secession by a coalition of people from an existing political 
unit along with the establishment of a new political unit that will then provide public goods to 
those who defect from the original unit” (p. 1023). Thus, internal exit is a means through 
which people can form states that supply them with their most preferred institutional 
arrangements. 
Internal exit goes a step beyond Hirschman’s (1970) notion of exit to consider the case 
when people have the option of exit from dissatisfaction and will also go on to form a new 
state.  However, the model of internal exit predicts that the threat of exit will act as a 
sufficient incentive for a rational government to set an internal exit-proof tax rate, i.e., a tax 
rate low enough to remove the incentive to exit.  Essentially, the threat of exit is sufficient to 
prompt government to set the tax rate at a level sufficient to prevent state exit from actually 
happening.  Thus, the model suggests that a state boundary is likely to be resistant to change, 
i.e., by preventing exit the state is able to at least maintain or perhaps ultimately increase its 
boundaries. 
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Friedman (1977) and Berkowitz (1997) reach conclusions similar to Buchanan and Faith.  
Friedman suggests that the threat of exit provides states with an incentive to expand 
boundaries or to build physical barriers, such as fences or walls, in order to increase the cost 
of exit (e.g., the minefields that surrounded former East Germany and Mozambique).  
Based on the experience of the Soviet Union, Berkowitz (1997) extends Buchanan and 
Faith’s internal exit model.  Berkowitz uses a three-stage game in which the state sets the tax 
rate centrally and the peripheral regions can choose to exit.  The model shows how the state 
will use redistribution and tax policy to prevent exit whenever possible.  The peripheral 
regions take advantage of the state’s reluctance to allow exit to influence centrally controlled 
policies by both threatening to withhold taxes and threatening to exit. 
Thus, the literature presented here presents different efficiency arguments for state 
boundaries.  In the case of Wittman (1991), the boundary will be reached when the costs of 
public good provision (which increases at a decreasing rate) equals the administrative costs of 
running the state.  In Alesina and Spolaore (1997, 2005), the boundary occurs where the costs 
of public good provision equal the political costs of a heterogeneous population.  In models 
with diseconomies of scale in public good provision, such Findlay’s (1996), the boundary 
exists when it is no longer rational to defend territory:  this boundary occurs when the 
members of the state are no longer able to make full productive use of the territory in terms of 
farming because all labour is directed at defending the state’s territory from enemies outside 
the boundary. 
Moreover, the literature is concerned with carrot and stick approaches to preventing 
boundary contraction by preventing exit.  Buchanan and Faith (1987) provide carrots in the 
form of lower taxes to prevent exit.  More commonly, though, the literature takes a stick 
approach to preventing exit.  Bolton and Roland (1997: 1070-1071) highlight instances in 
which threat of exit leads states to actually increase taxes to use the higher revenue to prevent 
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exit.  Friedman (1977) suggests expanding state boundaries by building fences and by other 
methods of increasing the costs of exit. Findlay (1996) and Wittman (1991) suggest military 
involvement to maintain state boundaries. 
Chapter 2 shows in what way political boundary formation in Africa, in particular 
precolonial southern Africa, differs from most commonly known cases.  Firstly, as 
mentioned, it considers documented historical cases of natural states (North, Wallis and 
Weingast 2009) in precolonial southern Africa instead of the more well-known modern or 
historical European experiences.  Secondly, in contrast to Wittman (1991), Alesina and 
Spolaore (1997, 2005) and Bolton and Roland (1997), there are no economies of scale in 
terms of public good provision to be gained from increasing boundaries.  Instead, the model 
presented in Chapter 2 is closer to Findlay (1996), in which there are diseconomies of scale.  
Thirdly, unlike the modern or historical European experience, in Chapter 2 the state 
boundaries under consideration are not defined by physical space or territory.  Instead, an 
African state boundary is defined socially by people acknowledging the leadership of a ruler.  
Lastly, in contrast to the more recent literature (e.g., Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 2005; 
Bolton and Roland 1997; Alesina 2003) in which tax paying, voting citizens are able to 
express their preferences for state boundaries, in an African state more emphasis is given to 
the ruler and the ruling elite.  Compared to democratic states, people in precolonial southern 
Africa have a more limited choice set.  Instead of being able to elect suitable rulers (or to vote 
them out of positions of power), the only choice that African people have is that of choosing 
which ruler to follow.  As Chapter 2 shows, the implication of this lack of choice is that, 
instead of considering what the incentives are to exit, we look at the incentives for potential 
rulers to leave with those people who will follow them. 
The result of these differences is that many times in precolonial Africa internal exit could 
not be prevented.  As the model presented in Chapter 2 shows, African internal exit results 
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from the payoff calculation of a member of the ruling elite’s desire to maximise his share of 
public revenue surplus.  Moreover, the model shows that an African state boundary is 
determined by the ability of the ruler to provide each of the other ruling elite members with a 
sufficient public revenue surplus share to remove the incentive to exit.  
 
1.3 Internal Organisation of Government. 
Experience suggests that, similarly to firms, governments are subject to problems of 
corruption, rent-seeking and shirking.  At the heart of these problems is the problem of 
aligning incentives, e.g., between owners and managers in firms and between voters and 
elected officials in government. The theory of the firm suggests the use of contracts to 
address incentive problems (e.g., Williamson 1979; Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart 1995).   
Within contract theory, there are two main approaches. The first relies on complete 
contracts; while the second considers incomplete contracts.  Complete contracts “specify all 
parties’ obligations in all future states of the world, to the fullest extent possible.  As a result, 
there will never be a need for the parties to revise or renegotiate the contract as the future 
unfolds.  The reason is that, if the parties ever changed or added a contract clause, this change 
or addition could have been anticipated and built into the original contract” (Hart 1995: 22).  
Essentially, a complete contract stipulates every obligation in every eventuality. 
Hart (1995: 23) suggests that there are three problems with complete contracts.  Firstly, it 
is difficult to plan for every eventuality that will take place in the future (e.g., very few 
people foresaw the Great Recession in 2007).  Secondly, contracting parties will struggle to 
negotiate about events that may have never occurred or even existed before.  Thirdly, it is 
very difficult to put every eventuality into writing in the contract in such a way as a third 
party (e.g., a judge) can understand and enforce it.  Thus, complete contracts are problematic 
due to bounded rationality (Williamson, e.g., 1979). 
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These problems mean that all contracts are essentially incomplete, namely that it is 
impossible to include all eventualities in the contract.  Hence, “the contract will contain gaps 
and missing provisions.  In particular, it will be silent about the parties’ obligations in some 
states of the world and will specify these obligations only coarsely or ambiguously in other 
states of the world” (Hart 1995: 23).  For example, a contract between a firm and its supplier 
will likely not specify obligations in the case of an uncommon natural disaster, such as a 
tsunami, or a man-made, never before seen event, such as 9/11. Since an incomplete contract 
is unable to specify all eventualities, it must specify which party has the rights to decide how 
to act in unforeseen circumstances.  These rights are known as control rights (e.g., Grossman 
and Hart 1986). 
Tirole is one of the first to suggest applying theory of the firm insights, and in particular, 
the theory of contracts, to the internal organisation of government (Tirole 1994).  As he 
writes, “there is little conceptual difference between governments and firms” (p. 1). Since 
there are both complete contract and incomplete contract theories, consider the application of 
each to the organisation of government. 
If we apply the theory of complete contracts to government, then the government is a 
group of people who are “motivated by formal and complete incentive schemes” (Tirole 
1994: 16).  Taking this view means that a constitution as a contract between the government 
and citizens needs to specify every eventuality, e.g., every natural disaster and every conflict 
situation.  However, for the same reasons that firm contracts are incomplete (bounded 
rationality), it is impossible for, e.g., any constitution to do that. 
A more realistic approach is to apply the theory of incomplete contracts to government. 
For example, a constitution may specify welfare rights, such as those right for social security, 
but will not specify welfare amount for each individual citizen. As in the case of firms, when 
applying incomplete contracts to government we can consider the importance of control 
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rights, e.g., which government agency responds in the case of a natural disaster; or which 
government ministry makes the decisions regarding conflict with another country.  As 
Seabright (1996) proposes, the “allocation of power matters, in short, precisely when it is not 
possible to specify in advance how the power should be exercised” (p. 65).  With control 
rights, we can view the organisation of government as the “distribution of control rights over 
various kinds of decisions.  This division is determined by constitutions, laws and tradition” 
(Tirole 1994: 16).  
Tirole (1994) emphasises the need to distribute control rights over multiple government 
branches or levels to ensure accountability.  Distributing rights over a single government 
branch can lead to “self-serving actions and capture” (p. 16).  Thus, control rights should be 
divided over several branches or levels of government, e.g., the well-known separation of 
judicial, legislative and executive branches of government. Citizens “cannot take for granted 
that politicians and bureaucrats will act in their interests, and because they cannot write 
constitutions constraining precisely the ways in which they will do so, they need to allocate 
power carefully to those parties who will, in pursuing their own perceived interests, be most 
likely to further those of the citizens themselves” (Seabright 1996: 65). 
The SGT of fiscal federalism is specifically concerned with the study of the organisation 
of government through the lens of the theory of the firm (e.g., Oates 2005; Weingast 2009).  
However, so far, the application of contract theory is limited.  Seabright (1996) provides an 
incomplete contracts model of the appropriate degree of decentralisation in a federation.  In 
the model, the incomplete contract is an election, which is considered incomplete because 
citizens and governments cannot verify the welfare of citizens due to both the actions of 
government and “various random shocks” (p. 65).  Seabright’s model shows that the choice 
to centralise or decentralise depends on the trade-off between policy coordination (reducing 
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interjurisdictional externalities) under centralisation and accountability to local jurisdictions 
under decentralisation. 
Nonetheless, Oates (2005: 359) criticises the Seabright model for failing to take into 
account the primary fiscal instrument of intergovernmental fiscal relations, namely 
intergovernmental grants.  Oates points out that matching grants are effective tools to solve 
the problem of interjurisdictional externalities.  Thus, with the use of grants, in particular 
matching grants, Seabright’s trade-off , says Oates, “effectively disappears” (p. 359). 
Unlike Seabright, Garzarelli (2006) submits that an intergovernmental grant can be viewed 
as a SGT equivalent of an incomplete contract. This is different from the traditional approach 
to intergovernmental grants, which mirrors consumer behaviour theory (e.g., King 1984).  
Under the traditional approach, the income and substitution effects determine community 
spending, e.g., a lump-sum grant will only have an income effect for the grant recipient. 
Instead, it is possible to consider intergovernmental grants as incomplete contracts in 
which the grant donor and the grant recipient are the contracting parties.  Rather than a grant 
being simply a transfer of funds from one level of government to another, an 
intergovernmental grant conveys “a preferred spending pattern to the recipient” (Garzarelli 
2006: 249).   
The interpretation of a grant as an incomplete contract has two implications.  Firstly, that 
all grants, irrespective of type, are conditional; for example, a lump-sum grant will only have 
a pure income effect if its payments are not dependent on the recipient’s actions.  Secondly, 
the extent of incompleteness varies with the type of grant; for example, a closed matching 
grant that specifies the good the grant should be spent on, the matching rate, and the 
maximum grant amount is more complete than an unconditional lump-sum grant which has 
none of these conditions (Garzarelli 2006: 249). 
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To view the incompleteness of the grant as leeway for the rational grant recipient to take 
advantage of is tantamount to viewing the leeway as a policy tool that provides a grant 
recipient with the freedom to experiment with policy and, in so doing, try to generate new 
knowledge to solve complex policy problems. Hence, Garzarelli suggests that viewing grants 
as incomplete contracts provides a role for grants in encouraging grant recipients to 
experiment with policies. 
This thesis builds on Garzarelli (2006) by viewing intergovernmental grants as incomplete 
contracts. Chapter 3 presents a simple model to show how different types of 
intergovernmental grants can engender different levels of learning at the local government 
level.  In particular, the model shows how a less complete grant, i.e., a lump-sum grant, can 
stimulate more recipient government experimentation than a more complete grant, i.e., a 
closed matching grant.  
 
1.4 Conclusion 
The economics of organisation can provide many insights for the political economy study of 
the boundary of the state and of the internal organisation of government.  The view of the 
public sector as an organization of organizations by North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) 
provides a broader framework for research into state formation.   Additionally, viewing the 
government through the lens of the theory of the firm provides a rich framework for 
analysing incentive problems in the internal organisation of government.   
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Chapter 2 
 
Internal Exit and Natural State Formation  
in Precolonial Southern Africa (ca. 1500-1910) 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Political institutions in Africa are known to be different from political institutions elsewhere 
(e.g., Iliffe 2013[1995,2007]; Osafo-Kwaako and Robinson 2013).  The study of African 
institutions is an important focus of recent economic research (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson 2002; Leeson 2005; Nunn 2008).  However, one area that has not yet been fully 
explored is precolonial African state formation.  This essay is about the formation of southern 
African states (ca. 1500-1910) with specific focus on the Ndebele, the Tawana, and the Zulu.1 
One possible reason for the gap in economic research into African state formation is the 
classic Weberian (1946:78) definition of a state:  a community that holds the “monopoly of 
the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” While this definition may be 
useful for “Western” or “modern” states, it restricts our understanding of states to only those 
with well-defined territorial bounds. 
Precolonial Africa is considered a frontier (Kopytoff 1989) in the sense that it “consists of 
politically open areas nestling between organized societies but ‘internal’ to the larger regions 
in which they are found – what might be called an internal or interstitial frontier” (p. 9).  The 
frontier is “an institutional vacuum” in the sense that it is possible to start a different type of 
“social order” (p. 10) at relatively low cost.  In this frontier, a precolonial southern African 
                                                 
1
 Southern African states typically settled in one of three regions in Southern Africa: along the coastline of what is now the 
KwaZulu-Natal province in South Africa and the southern region of Mozambique (e.g., the Zulu people); in the interior 
grasslands which extend from the Drakensberg, through the Highveld – which now lie in the provinces of the Free State, 
Gauteng, Mpumalanga, North West and KwaZulu Natal - into what is now Botswana and Zimbabwe (e.g., Sotho, Tswana 
and Venda people); and in the river valleys of what is now the Eastern Cape province in South Africa (e.g., Xhosa) (Peires 
(1983[1981]:139 and Iliffe 2013[1995,2007]: Chapter 6). 
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state was defined along social lines rather than by the territory it occupied (Schapera 
1963[1956]: 28; Kopytoff 1989: 22-23).  As such, an African state identified itself in terms of 
its ruler (e.g., a king or a chief).  For the same reason a state would take the name of its first 
ruler (e.g., Zulu).2  
 Another reason for the gap in research is the anthropological guideline suggesting that a 
state materialises only once the population of a community exceeds 100,000 people (North, 
Wallis and Weingast 2009:53).  Population density was much lower in Africa than in other 
parts of the world.  For example,  in 1750 the population density of sub-Saharan Africa was 
one tenth that of Europe (Herbst 2000: Table 1.1).   Hence, we cannot apply either Weber’s 
definition or the anthropological guideline to many precolonial southern African states.   
In Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded 
Human History, North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) provide a useful framework of states 
from a (pre-state) “foraging order” to a “natural state” and then to an “open access order” (the 
most advanced form of state or what we consider a modern state).  Since each of these types 
of states is defined along social rather than territorial lines, we can apply this typology to 
precolonial southern Africa.  The closest type of state to the ones considered in this essay is a 
natural state or limited access order, which is characterized by a governing self-interested 
elite.  The members of the elite limit access to privileges and, by limiting access, create 
incentives to respect each other’s privileges.  The elite also keeps violence in check as any 
violence will reduce privileges, especially rents extracted.   
In addition to the presence of a self-interested elite and the reduced violence compared to a 
foraging order, precolonial southern African states can be classified as natural states for two 
other factual reasons.  Firstly, a natural state can form from a population of one thousand 
people (North, Wallis and Weingast 2009: 53). This population size is also a more realistic 
                                                 
2
 See,e.g., Bryant (1905). 
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lower bound for precolonial southern African states.  The size of the Zulu population at its 
origin (mid-17th century) is estimated at 2,000 (Barfield 1993:47); while, in 1795, Tswana 
states (Barolong, Kwena and Ngwato) had populations of up to 5,000 (Thompson 
1995[1978]: 248).  Secondly, a southern African state was an “organization of organizations” 
(North, Wallis and Weingast 2009: 17): it was governed by a primary ruler in conjunction 
with the self-interested elite.  Members of the elite could be appointed by the ruler to lead 
wards, namely smaller administrative units of the state that helped collect the state’s public 
revenue.  For example, the 19th century Tawana state was divided into wards of 
approximately 10,000 people (Tlou 1977: 374). 
North, Wallis and Weingast (2009: 21) suggest that, in a natural state, if there is a change 
in the balance of power among members of the elite, then the change will result in civil wars 
and revolutions.  They do not consider another possibility: internal exit.  Internal exit is the 
“secession by a coalition of people from an existing political unit along with the 
establishment of a new political unit that will then provide public goods to those who defect 
from the original unit” (Buchanan and Faith 1987: 1023). 
This essay draws on Buchanan and Faith’s (1987) theory of internal exit.3  However, 
Buchanan and Faith predict that internal exit will not happen.4  Yet I report cases of internal 
exit that took place in precolonial southern Africa. One well-known example is that of the 
leader of the Ndebele, Mzilikazi.  In 1822, Mzilikazi (and people loyal to him) exited from 
the Zulu state and went on to eventually form the Ndebele (e.g., Brown 1969, Lye 1969b, 
Omer-Cooper 1969, Thompson 1969, Cobbing 1974, and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008).5   
                                                 
3
 This essay is also informed by Eggertsson (1991), McGuire and Olson (1996), and Bates, Greif and Singh (2002). 
4
 State formation through organisational offshoot is examined in the modern literature on federalism and secession 
(Berkowitz 1997; Bolton and Roland 1997; Alesina and Spolaore 2005).  The internal exit literature is the converse to 
“voting with the feet” (Tiebout 1956) and “exit” (Hirschman 1970) where there is an existing organisational alternative, 
i.e., an external exit, to defect to (e.g., another city, country).  
5
 The process of internal exit is often referred to as “fission” in the African History literature.  See, e.g., Hammond-Tooke 
(1964), Schapera (1968), Harinck (1969), Chanaiwa (1980), and Gulbrandsen (1993).  The southern African history 
literature (e.g., Kopytoff 1989; Herbst 2000) postulates that internal exit is both costless and common.  However, in 
precolonial southern Africa, it is not necessarily either of these two things.  Firstly, as documented in this essay, internal 
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Besides historical cases, there is a legacy from internal exit in the form of path dependence 
(e.g., Nunn 2008).  The Royal Bafokeng Nation that now owns land in the North West 
Province of South Africa originated from internal exit (Mbenga and Manson 2010: 2-7).  The 
King of the Ndebele is still recognized by the South African government as a traditional 
leader, while the Ndebele are the second largest ethnic group in Zimbabwe.  The Ndebele 
language – isiNdebele – is an official language in both South Africa and Zimbabwe (CIA 
2015a,b).  Essentially, internal exit occurred in precolonial southern Africa and led to the 
formation of new natural states, some of which still exist today. 
Why is it that in Africa internal exit as a threat fails and internal exit still takes place?  
With the aid of a simple, historically informed model, this essay offers a political economy 
explanation of why internal exit took place in precolonial southern Africa.  The explanation 
can be briefly summarised. 
Disputes among the elites, i.e., members of the royal family, cause one or more members 
to exit the original state.  An exiting member of the elite (“the exiter”) is often accompanied 
by some relatives, e.g., his brothers, and people not necessarily related to him (immigrants, 
loyal commoners, servants, and slaves).6  After exiting, the exiter and his people go on to 
form a new state in a new territory.  As the new natural state ruler, the exiter is responsible 
for enforcing the rule of law as he sees fit.  The exiter’s people will form a new privileged 
                                                                                                                                                        
exit could have a high cost.  Those who attempted internal exit could be hunted down and, if caught, killed by members of 
the original state.  Furthermore, even those state members viewed as potential exiters could be executed (e.g., Lestrade 
1930; Schapera 1963[1956]; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008). Secondly, internal exit is more common from approximately 1500 to 
1800.  During this time period, there were many internal exits that led to African states creating smaller natural states.  The 
smaller states would spread out over large geographical areas.  From 1800 until approximately 1910, it is less common for 
internal exit to take place.  Instead it is more common for African states to amalgamate and to form larger natural states. 
This phase of amalgamation, typically, is attributed to the Mfecane, the increase of trade through Delogoa Bay and the 
encroachment of the European colonialists (Legassick 1969, Omer-Cooper 1969, Wilson 1969).  In spite of Zulu efforts at 
state centralisation in this period the traditional political system in which elite members controlled wards remained.  Thus, 
internal exits from the state still occurred (Omer-Cooper 1969: 212).  The phenomenon of exit is not confined to southern 
Africa alone.  Exit also occurred in other parts of Africa (e.g., Asiwaju 1976, Herbst 1990).   
6
 I use male pronouns when referring to the ruler and other members of the elite.  The reason for this is that most southern 
African states (e.g., the Zulu) were patriarchal societies.  With a few exceptions, women were subordinate to men.  Thus, 
like other patriarchal societies in Medieval Europe, women did not participate in governing the state directly and did not 
take on the roles of ruler or ward leader.  However, it was possible for women to influence politics indirectly through their 
husbands, brothers and sons, as has been the case in Europe and elsewhere (Thomas (1970[1873]; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008: 
85).   
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elite while other people would typically be commoners who have few rights or privileges.  
Often the new state will take the name of the exiter.  For example, many Tswana states are 
named after their first rulers:  the Bakgatla after Mokgatla, the Bakwena after Kwena, the 
Barolong after Morolong, Baphiring after Phiri, among others (TNAD 1905; Schapera 
1963[1956], 1980).  The same is true for the Venda states, e.g., a state ruled by Tshivhase is 
known as vhahaTshivhase, which means “Tshivhase’s people” (Schapera 1963[1956]: 28).  
Hence, a new natural state can be formed through internal exit.  Notwithstanding the 
empirical setting being preliterate states, we are still dealing with rational economic actors 
who respond to their surrounding incentives (Posner 1979). 
This essay contends that there are four factors that contributed to the ease of internal exit 
in precolonial southern Africa.  Firstly, the abundance of land makes it easier to form a new 
state (e.g., Herbst 2000; Iliffe 2013[1995,2007]).  The second is the inverse of the first.  The 
relative scarcity of people increases their value.  The third is institutional in that the social 
institution of birthright grants privileges to the elite members of the polity only, facilitating 
exit.  Finally, the fourth is that together land abundance and scarcity of people means that 
there are decreasing returns to the “broadcast of power” over the people by existing rulers 
(Herbst 2000), again easing exit.  This essay points out that some exits can be from 
compromise (e.g., Coasian bargain) while others can result in conflict and even death.  
Whether exit actually takes place or not is a result of the payoff calculation from the exiter’s 
desire to maximise his share of the public revenue surplus: his expected net benefit from 
exiting being greater than his expected net costs.7   
                                                 
7
 This is not to say that all internal exit decisions were purely economic. There were cases where other reasons led to exit.  
For example, the Mogôpa ruler, Tsoku (ca.1750-1760), is described as a cruel man.  Mogôpa tradition suggests that when 
Tsoku had a live pregnant woman cut open for his own interest, many of his followers exited from his state.  When 
Motshabi became ruler of the Birwa (ca.1830) he was “too cowardly” to participate in his own “installation ceremonies” 
(similar to a coronation for a European king), Masâke left the Birwa to start his own state.  In the early 1900’s, Chief 
Matume of the Phalaborwa, angered his people by “seducing their wives and having any men who complained killed” 
(Schapera 1963[1956]: 155).  In response, his half-brother Selwana took most of the citizens of the state away to start a 
new one (Krige 1937: 339; Schapera 1963[1956]: 155).    
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2.2 Land, People, and the Right to Rule 
2.2.1 African Land 
African exit was unique because people could move from the original state to form a new 
state on unoccupied land.  The African environment was conductive to this movement of 
people given the abundance of land and the methods of output used.  As the land abundance 
thesis suggests, large parts of Africa were unoccupied because land of comparable quality 
(i.e., not particularly fertile) was a relatively abundant resource (Austin 2008; Hopkins 2009; 
Illife 2013[1995, 2007]).  Hence land was not considered valuable.  Consequently, property 
rights over land were either ill-defined or non-existent.8  Therefore, the abundance of land 
means that internal exit can be a fairly costless option.  
Africans relied primarily on the outputs from labour intensive activities, such as cattle 
farming, crops, and hunting.  To see why these activities did not raise the cost of exit, 
consider each in turn.  Cattle farming enabled internal exit as cattle were mobile and exiters 
could simply take the cattle with them upon exit (Omer-Cooper 1969; Sansom 1974[1937]: 
274-275; Hall 1986: 85; Austin 2008: 601).  Crops and hunting were seasonal outputs.  Crops 
were planted and harvested in the wet season and the crop yields were not able to be stored.  
Hunting took place in the dry season when wild animals were easier to find as they remained 
close to water (Austin 2008 and Hopkins 2009).  Hence, internal exit most likely took place 
during the dry season when the cost of exit was low: an exiter would not lose crop outputs 
and he could still engage in hunting while exiting. 
 
  
                                                 
8
 Cf. Demsetz 1967.  Similarly, Anderson and Hill (2004) show in reference to another frontier, namely the Wild West 
(California and Nevada) in the 19th century, that when land has no value there is no incentive to develop property rights.   
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2.2.2 African People: Value and Birthright 
Contrary to the abundance of land, “people were scarcer and, therefore, more important than 
land” (Chanaiwa 1980: 8).  The scarcity of African people meant that people were valued, not 
just for labour, but also for fulfilling “social and political needs” (Kopytoff and Miers 1977: 
69).9   For a ruler like Shaka of the Zulu, the size of the state in terms of people was a 
reflection of his power (Schapera 1937: 180; Omer-Cooper 1969: 209; Kuper 1975a: 70; 
Chanaiwa 1980: 8; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008: 77-82).10   
Typically, precolonial southern Africa states consisted of two groups of people, 
commoners (those unrelated to the ruler, slaves, servants, and immigrants) and elites 
(relatives of the ruler).  Commoners and elites had different rights, determining the type of 
internal exit that occurred.  The institution of birthright created options for the elite, but not 
for commoners.  First, a member of the elite was of royal descent and eligible to rule a state 
in his own right; a commoner was not.  Second, a member of the elite was able to attract 
people to follow his lead; again, a commoner was not.  Thus, the initiator of internal exit was 
most likely a member of the elite rather than a commoner. 
In point of fact, exit was not a viable option for a commoner as he would never be 
recognised as a ruler by other African people, i.e., he would not be able to acquire people.  In 
other contexts (e.g., Europe), a commoner could become a member of the elite through other 
means, such as accumulating wealth (e.g., Buchanan and Faith 1987) or through marriage 
(e.g., marrying the daughter of the state ruler).11  In the southern African case, despite the 
                                                 
9
 The scarcity and corresponding value attached to people has thus far been considered in the context of slavery (Kopytoff 
and Miers 1977; Fenske 2012).  It has not yet been considered in the context of African state formation. 
10
 Consequently, because people were valued highly, Africans developed property rights over people, especially relatives, 
commoners, women, and children.  Property rights over people are neither unique to Africa nor are they limited to the 
slave trade.  For example, for the greater part of “Western” history, a wife was considered her husband’s property. Also, in 
the Roman Empire, a father had the right to kill or sell his children.  Bride price (a payment from a groom to the bride’s 
family) is still practiced in parts of Asia and in sub-Saharan Africa. Cf. Leeson, Boettke and Lemke (2014); Ashraf, Bau, 
Nunn and Voena (2015). 
11
 In African states commoners could acquire status through cattle ownership and by marrying elite women (Chanaiwa 1980: 
7; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008: 75).  However, for the purpose of this essay, I do not consider these state members to be elite as 
they still will not have the right to rule a state (Richards 1961: 137).   
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availability of land, the only option available to a commoner was which elite member to 
follow.12  Consider now how the ruler (and other members of the elite) exerts power over 
people in an African state. 
 
2.2.3 Broadcast of Power and the African Elite 
Economic theories of the state are typically based on regions in which land is a scarce 
resource (Friedman 1977; Wittman 1991; Findlay 1996).13  For example, in considering the 
Romans, Han Chinese, and Ottomans, Findlay (1996) suggests that a ruler’s ability to 
broadcast power is a land maximisation problem.14  When land has value, it “is not simply 
given but has to be acquired and held against the tribe’s enemies who surround it” (p. 42).  As 
indicated, though, in Africa land had low value.  A rational African ruler would not maximise 
land simply because the marginal cost of controlling the land would have far exceeded the 
(negligible) marginal benefit of doing so.  Instead, as mentioned, people were the scarce, 
valuable resource.  Thus, an African ruler faced a different problem: a population 
maximisation problem. 
In parallel to Findlay (1996), one can think of a ruler as being in the centre of a “sphere of 
influence” from which emanates the ability to broadcast power (Herbst 1990) over people. 
Land still had a role to play, however. The abundance of land together with low population 
density meant that the ruler’s people were spread out over long distances.  It was easier for a 
ruler to maintain his power over the people closest to him.  As the distance between the ruler 
and his people increased, it became increasingly difficult for the ruler to maintain his power 
                                                 
12
 Kopytoff (1989: 17; 36) suggests that there was a duality to the relationship between the commoners and the ruler as 
African commoners valued rulers in a similar way that rulers valued them.  As the ruler’s power lay in acquiring people to 
follow him, the people’s power lay in choosing who to follow.  Commoners without a ruler would be without value; while 
a commoner could get a higher status by following a stronger ruler (Kopytoff 1989: 17; 36). 
13
 Even Tiebout’s (1956) model of external exit assumes land is a fixed factor. 
14
 This is a public organisation problem parallel to the Coasean (1937) limit to firm size which depends on increasing 
transactions costs. 
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over them (Herbst 2000; Iliffe (2013[1995, 2007]: 3).15  The physical boundary of this 
broadcast was incidental though, mattering for broadcast of power reasons only and not for 
land value increases intrinsic to territorial expansion.  Figure 2.1a illustrates the ability of the 
ruler to broadcast power.  The ruler’s power is higher over the people closer to him. As the 
distance from the power centre increases, the ruler’s power starts to decrease (represented by 
the increasing distances between the circles) until an upper limit beyond which the people are 
no longer under his power. 
One way for the ruler to increase his power was through the loyalty of other members of 
the elite.  The elite included the ruler and other members of the elite who were usually the 
ruler’s male relatives (brothers and uncles).  Different members of the elite had different 
rights and privileges.  The ruler had more rights and privileges than the rest of the elite as he 
was responsible for protecting and governing the state.  The other members of the elite were 
expected to assist in these responsibilities and, in doing so, would increase the ruler’s 
broadcast of power (Schapera 1937:180; Schapera 1963: 160-161; Uzoigwe 1977:47).  
 
  
                                                 
15
 One can think of the ruler’s power as the Doppler effect.  The closer the people are to the ruler the greater his power is felt 
but as they move further away the ruler’s power diminishes. 
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Figure 2.1 The Ruler’s Broadcast of Power 
 
 
This type of broadcast of power is documented by Tlou (1977) in reference to the Tawana.  
The Tawana state (in what is now Botswana) was formed in approximately 1800 when a 
member of the Ngwato elite, Tawana, exited from the Ngwato state with his ward.  Tawana 
and his people settled in the Kgwebe Hills where they expanded their population by asserting 
Ruler 
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Elite Elite 
Elite 
Ruler  
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power over other people in the area.  From 1800 to at least 1847 (when Letsholathebe became 
the ruler of the Tawana) the Tawana state was not defined by land but rather by the power of 
the Tawana ruler over his people.  The ruler was at the core of the state.  The ruler enlisted 
other elite members to help assert his power (Figure 2.1b).  However, the assistance of the 
other elite members decreased the extent to which the ruler’s power was felt (Tlou 1977: 371-
378).  Thus, the other members of the elite would increase the ruler’s power in absolute 
terms.  However, at the margin, the ruler’s power was likely to be diluted as he would have to 
share his power with the elite members who assist him. Moreover, using elite members to 
increase power could be a double-edged sword.  The more power delegated to elite members, 
the more likely the same elite members could also weaken, or even destroy, the state by 
exiting with their own people and forming a new state.  
   
2.2.4 A Paradigmatic Illustration 
Mzilikazi was an elite member who initially helped increase Shaka’s broadcast of power 
among the Zulu people by commanding his own people (the Khumalo), but ultimately chose 
to exit with his people to form his own state.16   In 1822, after completing a raid, Mzilikazi 
signalled his intention to exit by refusing to pay taxes on the raid (Becker 1966: 36; 
Thompson 1969: 347).  Mzilikazi then exited from the Zulu with between two and three 
hundred warriors plus an undetermined number of women and children.  After Mzilikazi’s 
exit, another member of the elite was sent after him and his people to force return to the Zulu.  
As a result, Mzilikazi and his people were unable to settle immediately as they had to first 
evade the Zulu elite members pursuing them.  Having successfully evaded pursuit, by 1829 
                                                 
16
 Historical details of internal exits from states other than Mzilikazi’s Ndebele in southern Africa are limited.  African 
history tends to emphasize the successes of particular leaders, like Mzilikazi, while lacking detailed information on other 
people or events, especially unsuccessful exiters.  Nevertheless, we can still find historical evidence that internal exit from 
many southern African states occurred.  Rasmussen (1977) expresses a similar sentiment.  The primary sources of internal 
exit are from missionaries who observed the African states (e.g., Thomas 1970[1873]); while secondary sources rely on 
oral tradition (e.g., Schapera 1963[1956]; Sansom 1974[1937]).   
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the Ndebele population had grown to an estimated 60,000 to 80,000 people of which between 
1,000 and 5,000 were warriors (1936 estimate) (Lye 1969b: 96).   
 
Figure 2.2 Map of Mzilikazi’s Internal Exit  
 
 
Figure 2.2 shows the route Mzilikazi took after exiting from the Zulu in the context of 
current African borders.  The Zulu state was located near the east coast of what is now South 
Africa.  The route shows how Mzilikazi and his people headed inland from the east coast, 
eventually crossing the Limpopo River (which is now the border between South Africa and 
its north eastern neighbours, Zimbabwe and Mozambique).17 Ultimately, it took 
approximately twenty-five years for Mzilikazi and his people to form a new state, i.e., the 
                                                 
17
 For more details on the route that Mzilikazi took and his efforts to evade the Zulu, see Lye (1969b), Cobbing (1974) and 
Chanaiwa (1976).  The Ndebele population grew rapidly after exit as the state incorporated Nguni and Sotho people (Lye 
1969b: 96). 
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Ndebele, in what is now Zimbabwe (Thomas 1970[1873]: 162; Cobbing 1974: 615).  By 
1880, the population of the Ndebele was estimated to be between 150,000 and 200,000 
people (Chanaiwa 1976: 60).  
 
2.3 Model 
 
Based on the historical evidence, we can isolate three exogenous factors of African 
uniqueness that contributed to the ease of internal exit:  land abundance; birthright; and 
decreasing returns to the broadcast of power.  The abundant land allowed exit to be a physical 
movement of people from one area to another.   Birthright gave the ruler the right to rule but 
also entitled other elite members to rule over people.  The decreasing returns to the broadcast 
of power necessitated that a ruler delegate power to the same elite members with the right to 
rule.   
An additional factor unique to Africa was the relative scarcity of people which increased 
their value.  In strictly economic terms, people were valuable to a ruler because they could 
generate a surplus.  Hence, the ruler would try to maximise the number of people which in 
turn would maximise the surplus.  However, to increase his broadcast of power over people 
and, consequently, the surplus extracted, the ruler needed assistance from other elite 
members.  The other elite members would help to extract a surplus from the state in exchange 
for a share of the surplus.   
The other elite members were rational in that, similarly to the ruler, they were surplus 
share maximisers.  Since these other elite members were entitled to rule their own state, when 
the surplus they could expect to extract from their own newly created state exceeded the 
surplus share allocation from the ruler (and any possible costs of exit, e.g., conflict), the 
rational elite member would exercise the option of internal exit.  Whether or not the ruler of 
the original state decided to fight the exit (and thereby increase the cost of exit) depended on 
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the difference between the loss of surplus due to the loss of people and the gain in the share 
of the surplus allocated to the elite exiter. 
 
2.3.1 The African State as a Public Organisation 
Consider a state of  people,  ≥ 1000.  The  people consist of two groups, the elite, , 
and commoners, , such that  + = .  In economic terms, the difference between the 
elite and the commoners is that the members of the elite share in the public revenue surplus 
of the state while the commoners do not.  One of the members of the elite is the ruler of the 
state.  The ruler is unique within the elite because he sets the tax rate and establishes the share 
of the surplus allocated to himself, and to each of the other elite members. 
The history literature suggests that in the southern African states before 1790 the ruler 
supplied public goods, such as law and spirituality. Subsequently, a ruler’s responsibilities 
also included protecting his people from enemies, rain-making, managing grain production, 
allocating cattle, and regulating the ivory trade (Chanaiwa 1980: 8; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008: 
75).  Similarly to others (e.g., Bates, Greif, and Singh 2002), for simplicity I assume that 
these public goods can be captured by a simple public good: order.  The cost of order depends 
on the size of the population, 

 = 
().          (1) 
As mentioned, the scarce populations spread over vast distances lead to the ruler facing 
decreasing returns to the broadcast of power.  These same conditions mean that the cost of 
providing order increases at an increasing rate as the size of the population increases, i.e., 

 > 0 and   > 0 (Figure 2.3a). 
Public revenue is obtained by taxing output which, as indicated, historically took the form 
of crops, livestock, and hunting.  I assume that, since the ruler provides order, the people 
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have an incentive to produce output beyond subsistence levels.  As output was strictly labour-
intensive, the state’s output is a function of the population:18 
  = ().          (2) 
A Venda proverb says, “(y)ou cannot appear before the lion without a piece of firewood in 
your hand,” meaning that a person may not appear before the ruler of a state without paying a 
tax (Schapera 1963[1956]:101).  Taxes in states such as the Zulu took the form of percentage 
shares of output.19  Taxes could also be paid in nature, e.g., directly in the form of labour by 
tending the ruler’s cattle or tending his crops (Guy 1983[1981]:43). 
Furthermore, southern African history indicates that the amount of tax due was 
proportional to the output of the state.  For example, in the Luapula area (now Northern 
Zimbabwe), a member of an established state could have a higher tax rate than the member of 
a newly established state (Vansina 1962:327).  Thus, tax is proportional at a rate of , where 
 ∈ (0,1).20 It follows that public revenue  is obtained through taxing income () at a rate 
of , 
  = (),           (3) 
Analogously to providing order, public revenue also exhibits decreasing returns given the 
difficulties of collecting taxes from sparsely settled people over large distances, i.e.,  > 0 
and  < 0 (Figure 2.3a).   
                                                 
18
 Every person of the same gender provided essentially one labour unit: the marginal benefit of each additional unit of 
labour was constant (Kopytoff 1989: 42). 
19
 A well-known example of a tax is the Sotho-Tswana’s first-fruits ceremony in which the ruler “bit into the first fruits of 
the harvest,” (Legassick 1969: 25), i.e., the Sotho-Tswana ruler would accept tax in the form of a percentage of the total 
harvest.  Beer made from grain was another way to pay taxes on crops.  Members of the Lobedu state and the Basotho 
could pay taxes in the form of pots of beer brewed from maize and sorghum.  An example of a hunting tax was a 
percentage share of the hunting returns, e.g., “one tusk of every elephant killed, and the breast of every ox or large wild 
animal slaughtered” (Legassick 1969: 25).  For other examples of taxes see Hunt (1931), Schapera (1963[1956]: 99-100), 
Ballard (1983[1981]), and Gulbrandson (1993). More specific taxes could also apply:  the Zulu had another unique form of 
tax in that each large household was required to give an adult daughter to the ruler (Gulbrandson 1993:556; Schapera 
1963[1956]: 100-101).    
20I use the term tax instead of tribute or rent.  The relationship between the ruler and the citizens of African states is one of 
exchange in which the citizen tax payers expected something in return for taxes, usually protection and public order.  
Hence this is not unlike tax systems that exist today (Schapera 1973[1953]: 26).   
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Each member of the state, whether elite or not, thus contributes to public revenue.  This 
assumption is in line with Buchanan and Faith (1987) and, more importantly, is historically 
accurate.  The ruler of the state was expected to use his own income for the good of the state, 
e.g., redistribution (e.g., Vansina 1962: 327; Schapera 1963[1956]: 99-100; Legassick 1969: 
51-52 regarding Sotho-Tswana redistribution; Hammond-Tooke 1985; and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
2008: 80-81 regarding Ndebele redistribution).   The historical evidence is also in line with 
the McGuire and Olson (1996) model of autocracy: the rational ruler implements 
redistribution because it allows him to increase the number of people in his polity, and hence 
ultimately increase the public revenue he can extract. 
Historically, the rational southern African ruler will choose to extract more public revenue 
than was required to simply cover the cost of providing the public good, i.e., the ruler would 
extract a surplus. The difference between public revenue (3) and the cost of providing order  
(1) is the surplus (i.e., the net benefit of providing order): 
  =  − 
,          (4) 
or,  
  = () − 
().          (5) 
The ruler’s problem is therefore: 
Max:  = () − 
().   
s.t.:  () > 
() 
as shown in Figure 2.3b.  An African state has a minimum population size (e.g.,  = 1000) 
and a maximum population size .21  For very large populations ( > ) the ruler 
will not provide order because the cost of providing order will outweigh the benefit (i.e., 
                                                 
21
 Populations below 1000 people are considered foraging orders rather than natural states (North, Wallis, and Weingast 
2009).  We can assume that when the population is smaller than 1000 that the ruler will not be able to extract sufficient 
surplus to justify his incentive to rule. 
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() < 
()) and the ruler will be unable to extract a surplus. The maximum population 
size corresponds to the boundary of the broadcast of power in Figure 2.1.  
Within these bounds, 1000 ≤  ≤ , the ruler will form a state over people as he will 
be able to extract a surplus.22  However, because of the difficulties of broadcasting power in 
terms of both extracting revenue and providing order, the surplus extracted depends on the 
population size.  An optimal point exists at ∗ at which point the population size is such that 
the ruler can maximise the difference between the public revenue collected and the cost of 
providing order.  For a population 1000 <  < ∗ , the surplus increases at a decreasing rate 
as the population increases,   > 0,   < 0.  After reaching a maximum at ∗, for a 
population ∗ <  < !"#	, the surplus decreases at an increasing rate as the population 
increases,   < 0,    > 0 (Figure 2.3b). 
Accordingly, if the population size is ∗, then any change in the population size will be 
detrimental to the total surplus extracted.  However, if  ≠ ∗, then a change in population 
size can allow the ruler to extract more or less surplus:  if 1000 ≤  < ∗ then a decrease in 
the population can result in a smaller surplus; if ∗ <  ≤ !"#	, then a decrease in the 
population can result in a larger surplus. To increase the broadcast of power, the ruler enlists 
the help of the other members of the elite. It is at this juncture that the African state begins to 
move away from a monolithic structure as in Olson’s (1993) bandit theory, to an organisation 
of organisations as in North, Wallis and Weingast’s (2009) theory. 
 
  
                                                 
22
 For a given N, the rational ruler will set the amount of order and the corresponding tax rate to maximise the surplus 
extracted. 
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Figure 2.3 Population Size and Surplus 
 
 
The other elite members help the ruler to extract a surplus from the rest of the state.  In 
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In turn, the elite will use this wealth to marry more women than commoners and to acquire 
power by attracting more people (Guy 1983[1981]:43; Omer-Cooper 1994: 13; Ndlovu-
Gatsheni 2008: 75).  
Once the elite members are enlisted to help extract a surplus, the elite members will start 
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of organisations (e.g., Kopytoff 1989).  The smaller groups were known as wards.23 A ward 
was a smaller administrative unit for, e.g., the allocation of pastures and for the adjudication 
of minor crimes (theft, domestic disputes) populated by artisans, clans, conquered people, 
families, immigrants, warriors, etc.  It was governed by its own elite head, often with the aid 
of other elite members, and contributed to the central fisc (Schapera 1937:180; Omer-Cooper 
1969:209; Cobbing 1974; Kuper 1975a,b; Chanaiwa 1980; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008: 75). For 
example, the Zulu state elite included the izikhulu who were the elite ward leaders, like 
Mzilikazi (Guy 1983[1981]:43).   
A ward could be run as a “mini-state” within the state.  As noted, a member of the elite 
would lead the ward, assisted by other members of the elite; for example, a Sotho ward leader 
was assisted by relatives by marriage and relatives on his mother’s side.  The rest of the ward 
would consist of citizens who were commoners.  A ward leader could acquire power by 
increasing the number of people in his ward, i.e., by increasing the broadcast of his own 
power (Schapera 1937:180; Omer-Cooper 1969:209; Kuper 1975a: 70; Chanaiwa 1980:8; 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008: 77-82).   
As mentioned, in exchange for helping to extract a surplus from the wards, the other elite 
members would share in the surplus.  The proportion of the surplus that elite member &, 
where & = 1… and & ∈ ℕ, receives is )* ∈ (0,1), where ∑ )*,*-. = 1, Since the ruler is the 
primary member of the elite, let his share be )..  The ruler’s share is thus . = ).∗.  The 
ruler would typically take the largest surplus share and would typically be the wealthiest man 
in the state as a result.  In 1932, the ruler of the Kgatla owned one-seventh of his state’s 
income:  he received one thousand two hundred bags of corn annually, thirty cattle from any 
stock that had strayed, and between twenty and forty cattle in fines.  Similarly, in 1936, the 
Swazi ruler was estimated to own ten times as many cattle as the next wealthiest Swazi 
                                                 
23
 African states could have complex political divisions, e.g., a state divided into villages, in turn divided into wards, and 
then into homesteads.  This essay uses the term ward for two reasons: for simplicity and because Mzilikazi was the leader 
of the Khumalo ward in the Zulu state (Hoernlé 1962[1937]: 86-90).   
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citizen (Schapera 1963[1956]: 101-102).  Even today there is a legacy in terms of surplus 
shares allocated to traditional rulers (and other elite members).  King Goodwill Zwelithini 
and six other traditional rulers in South Africa still receive annual surplus shares from public 
revenue (“How Much You Pay for South Africa’s Royal Families” 2015) 
The other members of the elite each receive a fraction, )*, of the remaining surplus 
(1 − ).)∗, apportioned at the ruler’s discretion.  That is to say that, the ruler can divide the 
surplus shares equally among members of the elite, but this is not necessarily the case.  For 
example, an elite member’s surplus share might be proportional to his ward size.  Thus, each 
of the other elite members receives a surplus share * = )*∗, where ∑ *,*-/ = (1 − ).)∗. 
Thus, surplus shares are constrained by the surplus share taken by the ruler, )., the size of the 
surplus, ∗, the size of the elite, , and the discretion of the ruler.  The Ndebele elite 
consisted of approximately between 22,500 and 30,000 members (15% of the total 
population) in 1880 (Chanaiwa 1976: 60). 
 
2.3.2 Internal Exits: Compromise or Conflict  
Suppose that one elite member (e.g., a ward leader) is considering exiting the state with his 
own people, namely, he is a potential exiter like Mzilikazi.  The potential exiter will take 
people who are elite, 0, and people who are commoners, 1.    
In deciding whether to exit, the potential exiter will weigh up the expected costs and 
benefits of exit.  In precolonial southern Africa the ruler’s response to the exit influenced the 
expected cost of exit.  When a ruler objected to exit, an exiter would be punished for exiting 
or even for considering exiting.  
The circumstances of the documented cases of exit are very different: some occurred 
through compromise (e.g., Xhosa, Sotho, Venda,) while others ended with violent conflict 
(e.g., Zulu, Tswana).  Exit through compromise is documented among the Xhosa, Sotho and 
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Venda.  With the support of the other members of the elite, a ruler’s sons and their people 
would often exit the original state in order to form their own state (Lye 1969a; Peires 
1983[1981]; Iliffe 2013[1995,2007]).  For example, sons of the ruler of the Xhosa would 
each set up their own polity, which was known as their own “Great Place” (Peires 
1983[1981]). Venda rulers were considered restrained because the ruler would first try to 
negotiate a compromise before resorting to force (Lestrade 1930:321).24  Whether the 
compromise worked or not would depend on the number of people exiting compared to the 
number of people remaining in the original state.  
Zulu and Tswana exits could be far more costly in terms of the punishment inflicted by the 
existing rulers.  Exiters could still be punished for internal exit if caught by the original 
polity.  Exiters and potential exiters were well aware of the possible punishments.  For 
instance, if caught, exiters from the Zulu state were executed. When Mzilikazi exited from 
the Zulu, he and his people had to “run for their lives to escape Shaka’s reach” (Chanaiwa 
1976: 53).  In fact, many of Mzilikazi’s people were executed for exiting at enTubeni Hills 
(see Figure 2.2). 
Subsequently, despite being an exiter himself, once he had established the Ndebele, 
Mzilikazi would execute any exiters, and even those he considered potential exiters (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni 2008).  For example, oral history reports that Gundwane was an exiter from the 
Ndebele.  He travelled with his people over the Limpopo River.  However, when Mzilikazi 
arrived at Gundwane’s state, he had Gundwane executed and incorporated Gundwane’s 
people into the Ndebele (Cobbing 1974; Rasmussen 1977). 
If a Tswana ruler learnt of an elite member’s intention to exit, he would confiscate that 
elite member’s cattle to try to discourage exit.  If a Tswana member of the elite did lead his 
people to exit, the Tswana ruler would try to bring the exiters back by force.  If the exiters 
                                                 
24
 Cf. Coase (1960). 
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won, they could set up their own state, but would bear a cost for exiting (e.g., loss of people 
during a conflict).  If the exiters lost, they would be forced to return to the original state and 
be punished (Schapera 1963[1956]: 154-165; 1980). For example, when the Ngwaketse broke 
away from the Kwena state (c. 1750) and when the Tawana exited from the Ngwato state (c. 
1795), the state rulers sent men after them but these men were defeated.  Both the Ngwaketse 
and the Tawana, thus, succeeded in exiting and setting up their own states.  Later, around 
1840, Phethu and Bathoen attempted to exit from their half-brother, the Ngwato state ruler, 
Sekgomo I.  Sekgomo I reacted to the exit by pursuing and killing them both before bringing 
their people back to the original state (Schapera 1963[1956]: 154-165, 1980; Mönnig 1988). 
Since the potential exiter takes both members of the elite and commoners, the exit 
generates an externality in the form of a change in the surplus in the original polity.  The loss 
of the members of the elite leads to fewer elite members remaining to share the surplus with.  
But the loss of both elite members and commoners lowers the possible tax revenue pool. 
Historically, the ruler will thus support, be indifferent about, or oppose the internal exit.  If 
the ruler supports exit or, at least, is indifferent, then the potential exiter will be able to exit at 
negligible cost.  However, if the ruler opposes exit, then internal exit will come at a cost, 
usually in terms of a loss of people in a conflict.   
Suppose the ruler’s response to the exit depends on the effect of internal exit on his 
surplus share, ..  Further suppose that, at least initially, the tax rate stays the same. 
The change in the ruler’s surplus share due to the loss of people (both commoner and elite) 
that then exit is: 
 2 = ). 3 4 − 5 + 62 (() − 
()).     (6)  
The change in the ruler’s surplus share depends on two changes shown in Equation (6).  
The first, ). 3 4 − 5	, is the proportion of the surplus change due to exit that is allocated 
to the ruler.  Note that, as discussed, depending on the size of  at the time of exit, the term 
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3 4 − 5	can be positive or negative.  The second, 62 (() − 
()), is the change in 
the proportion of the surplus that the ruler is allocated.  Since some of the exiters are elite 
members, the ruler can take a greater proportion of the surplus after exit.  Consider the 
implications of exit on	 2 . 
If   2 ≥ 0	, then the change in the surplus share allocated to the ruler counterbalances the 
change in the surplus.  For example, if the exit leads to a smaller state surplus, but the ruler 
gets a larger share of that surplus, then his surplus share will be unchanged or, in fact, could 
increase.  Thus, the ruler will be unaffected, or even better off, after the internal exit.  Hence 
the ruler will be either indifferent or unlikely to oppose the exit.  In this case a potential exiter 
will be able to leave costlessly (similar to a Coasean bargain), e.g., Sotho and Xhosa internal 
exits. 
If   2 < 0, then change in the surplus share allocated to the ruler does not counterbalance 
the change in the surplus.  In this case, if the size of the surplus decreases due to the decrease 
in population size, but the ruler does not get a larger share of that surplus, and he will be 
worse off than before the exit.  Hence, the ruler has an incentive to prevent exit and will 
impose costs on any potential exits (e.g., Mzilikazi’s exit from the Zulu). Historically, the 
cost of exit was conflict which could have two possible outcomes.  The first is that the exiter 
defeats the ruler and was able to exit successfully, though not costlessly.  The second is that 
the ruler defeats the exiter and his supporters, in which case the exiter is unable to exit and, 
instead, would bear the cost of punishment for attempting to exit.  The ruler’s response and 
the potential costs of exit will influence the potential exiter’s decision.  
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2.3.3 The Potential Exiter’s Decision: To Exit or Not? 
The potential exiter (e.g, Mzilikazi) faces a decision between the known outcome of staying 
and the unknown outcome of exiting.25  See the decision tree in Figure 2.4.  If the potential 
exiter decides not to exit (Outcome 1), then he will continue to receive his surplus share, i.e., 
*,*9., i.e., a new natural state will not be formed.  If he decides to exit, he will have an 
expected payoff from the internal exit (:;&<) which, as mentioned, depends on the response 
of the ruler and the outcome of any conflict that may occur (Outcomes 2, 3 and 4).  
Suppose that with probability =., the ruler (e.g., Shaka) either supports or is indifferent 
about exit (i.e., when the ruler’s surplus share increases or remains unchanged after exit, 
 2 ≥ 0).  In this outcome, the potential exiter then can expect, upon internal exiting, to 
receive a share of the surplus in the new state that he establishes.  Thus, with =.,	the potential 
exiter can expect a payoff of >?, which is the surplus share the potential exiter expects to 
receive in his new state (outcome 2).  Hence, outcome 2 leads to natural state formation.26  
Now, with probability	1 − =., the ruler will oppose internal exit (i.e., when the ruler’s 
surplus share decreases due to the exit,  2 < 0).  There are two possible outcomes.  Firstly, 
with probability	=/, that the potential exiter defeats the ruler and is able to exit.  
Consequently, with =/, the potential exiter can expect a payoff of >? − @, which is the share 
of the surplus in the new state that he establishes less the cost of the conflict.  Hence, 
outcome 3 also leads to the formation of a new natural state (e.g., the Ndebele).   
Secondly, with probability =A, the potential exiter’s attempt at internal exit fails as he and 
his people are unable to defeat the ruler.  Hence, the potential exiter can expect to be 
                                                 
25
 In parallel to the state as an organisation of organisations, we can think of the exiter as a political entrepreneur (Kopytoff 
1989: 17). As a political entrepreneur, an exiter like Mzilikazi had two goals: achieving independence from the original 
state and acquiring people.  Like the entrepreneurs conceptualised by Knight (2006 [1921]), these political entrepreneurs 
faced a trade-off: the uncertainty of creating new natural state on the African frontier in exchange for expected future 
rewards in the form of surpluses. Cf. Klein, Mahoney, McGahan, and Pitelis (2010). 
26
 The potential exiter will be the ruler in the new state he establishes.  Thus, the exiter will be able to determine the amount 
of order, the tax rate and the surplus shares allocated, in the same way that the ruler does in the original state. 
40 
 
punished by the ruler. Thus, with =A, the potential exiter can expect a negative payoff of – C, 
where C is the punishment inflicted upon the potential exiter by ruler.  Outcome 4, therefore, 
does not lead to natural state formation. 
The expected payoff from internal exit for the potential exiter, i.e., the sum of outcomes 
2,3, and 4, is: 
(&D<:EDFG	:;&<) 	= 	=.(HIJJKE<:L	:;&<) 
 +		=/(KJJKH:L, HIMM:HHNIG	:;&<) 
			+		=A(KJJKH:L, NF&G:L	:;&<), 
or, 
(&D<:EDFG	:;&<) = =.(>?) + =/(>? − @) + =A(−C),     (7) 
where ∑ =* = 1A*-. .   
To decide whether or not to exit from the original state, the potential exiter will compare 
his surplus share from staying with the state with his expected payoff from exiting, i.e., the 
potential exiter will compare * with equation (6). 
The potential exiter will be an exiter if 
* < =.(>?) + =/(>? − @) + =A(−C) .      (8) 
Since =. + =/ + =A = 1, equation (8) can be restated as 
(=. + =/)>?−* > =/@ + =AC.       (9) 
Equation (9) shows that if expected net increase in surplus share from internal exit, (=. +
=/)>?−*, is greater than the expected cost of exit, =/@ + =AC, then the potential exiter will 
choose to exit and form new natural state.   
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Figure 2.4 Internal Exit Decision Tree 
 
 
2.3.4 Can the Ruler Prevent Exit? 
Exiting and setting up a new state is a risky undertaking.  The state ruler knows that a 
potential exiter may choose to avoid the risk of internal exit if given a sufficient surplus 
share.  The surplus share sufficient to prevent exit is the certainty equivalent of internal exit.  
To determine the certainty equivalent, first consider the expected utility of internal exit that 
corresponds to the expected utility of the payoff of exit for the potential exiter, i.e., 
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The certainty equivalent, P*, is, thus, the surplus share that provides the same utility as the 
expected utility of internal exit, i.e.,  
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If the ruler provides a surplus share greater than or equal to the certainty equivalent, i.e., if 
* ≥ P*, then a potential exiter will choose not to exit.  Similarly, if the ruler provides a 
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surplus share less than the certainty equivalent, i.e., if * < P*, then a potential exiter will 
choose internal exit.27  
Consequently, to prevent exit from his state, the ruler needs to ensure that each of the 
other elite members receives a share of the surplus that is at least equal to his certainty 
equivalent of internal exit, i.e., * ≥ P*.  Accordingly, the sum of the surplus shares allocated 
to the other members of the elite must at least be equal to the sum of the other elite members’ 
certainty equivalent, i.e.,  
∑ *,*-/ = (1 − ).)S∗ ≥ ∑ P*,*-/ .        (12) 
Whether the ruler is able to provide every member of the elite with his certainty equivalent 
depends on three factors: the ruler’s share of the surplus, ).; the size of the elite, ; and the 
surplus extracted, .  Assume that the ruler sets his own surplus share at the minimum that he 
is willing to accept in return for ruling the state, ).∗.   
Two factors remain: the size of the elite and the surplus.  Consider the size of the elite 
first.  Since, historically, elite status was a birthright, the ruler would find it difficult to 
constrain the size of the elite.  Consequently, as the size of the elite grows, the ruler will 
reach a threshold after which he can no longer ensure that each elite member receives a 
surplus share that corresponds to the certainty equivalent of exit.  Thus, when, 
(1 − ).∗)S∗ < ∑ P*,*-/ ,         (13) 
at least one member of the elite will no longer receive a surplus share equal to his certainty 
equivalent.  The rational response of the elite member who does not receives a surplus share 
below his certainty equivalent is to exit and form a new natural state.  Thus, in terms of 
surplus shares, equation (13) provides a boundary for the African state. 
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 A potential exiter’s risk preferences will inform the certainty equivalent.  For example, a risk-averse potential exiter, the 
certainty equivalent can be less than the expected payoff from exiting, i.e., P* < (&D<:EDFG	:;&<).  Thus, a risk-averse 
potential exiter can be given surplus shares less than his expected payoff of internal exit.  Similarly a risk-neutral exiter 
requires a surplus share equal to their expected payoff of internal exit, while a risk-seeking exiter requires a surplus share 
greater than his expected payoff of internal exit. 
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A precolonial southern African ruler needed to find ways to constrain the size of the elite 
if he intended to prevent internal exit.  One way to constrain the size of the southern African 
elite that is documented in the history literature is for the ruler to have his male relatives, 
including his sons and brothers, killed.  Mzilikazi is thought to have had two of his sons 
killed  (Thomas 1970[1873]: 227; Cobbing 1974:626; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008: 77).  Zulu 
rulers, including Shaka and Dingane, had their sons killed at birth.  Dingane also killed his 
brothers (Schapera 1963[1956]:173).  However, the ruler needed to have some restraint as too 
much violence would cause him to lose his own followers. 
The last factor is the surplus.  To grow the surplus, the ruler would need to increase the 
number people over whom he can broadcast his power.  To do so he will have to delegate 
power to elite members who can help him reach more people.  But this strategy can backfire 
as it empowers the other elite members to lead people in their own right.  Thus, the 
delegation of power ultimately can lead to exit. 
 
2.4 Related Literature   
It is useful to consider how the model and results of this essay relate to Buchanan and Faith’s 
(1987) model of internal exit, Kopytoff’s (1989) frontier social order, and North, Wallis and 
Weingast’s (2009) framework of a state as an organisation of organisations.  Consider each in 
turn.  
The original Buchanan and Faith (1987) internal exit model presents three main 
differences with the model presented here.  The first regards the issue of land.  Buchanan and 
Faith envision a scenario in which a community declares independence and decides to 
provide its own public goods.  The community remains on their existing land, simply 
changing political institutions. A recent example of an attempt at this type of internal exit is 
Scotland’s bid for independence from Great Britain in 2014.  African internal exit instead 
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shows how groups of people will physically exit from an existing state to move to a new land 
where they will go on to establish a new state.   
The second difference is the initiator of internal exit.  The Buchanan and Faith model 
suggests that the initiator will be a tax paying citizen who is essentially a commoner.  The 
commoner’s motive for exit is to avoid an exploitative tax rate.  The African internal exit 
initiator is a surplus-sharing elite member who takes his own people with him to start a new 
state.  This elite member is motivated to start his own state in which he will be the ruler and 
will be able to extract a surplus greater than the surplus share he received in the original state.   
Thirdly, the models differ in predictions. The Buchanan and Faith model predicts that 
internal exit will not happen.  Because the exiter is a commoner, the state can prevent exit by 
setting a non-exploitative tax rate.28 However, in Africa the situation is reversed.  A ruler 
facing conditions of land abundance, decreasing returns to the broadcast of power, a scarcity 
of people, and the elite institution of birthright was not always capable to prevent an elite 
member from exiting.  As this model shows, there are three factors that determine whether or 
not a ruler is able to set an internal exit-proof surplus shares: the surplus extracted, the ruler’s 
share, and the size of the elite.    
This model offers an economic explanation for Kopytoff’s (1989) “frontier social order.”  
Kopytoff (p.16-17) identifies eleven features of the creation of new social orders on the 
frontier: (1) “a social dynamic” that produced exiters, (2) group exits, (3) “the institutional 
vacuum,” (4) replication of existing states, (5) relatives as part of the group, (6) non-relative, 
non-elite subjects, (7) a distinction between “firstcomers” and “latecomers,” (8) 
“patrimonialism,” (9) inter-dependence between the ruler and his people, (10) “regional 
context,” and (11) “the frontier as a historical process.”   
                                                 
28
 Buchanan and Faith (1987) also extend the model to allow commoners who are likely to exit to become surplus-sharing 
members of the elite in order to remove the incentive to exit.  As shown, in the African context this is not possible due to 
institutional constraints. 
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Consider each of these features in comparison to this model.  (1) Rather than exiters being 
a social construction, this model suggests that the decision to exit was an economic one 
determined by the expected net increase in the surplus share due to exiting.  (2) In this model, 
the reason for exit in groups is that the scarcity of valuable people meant that any prospective 
ruler would take as many people as possible with them. (3), (4), and (10) While the 
institutional vacuum of the frontier might have allowed for the construction of any desirable 
natural state, the examples of exit reported in this essay are, for the most part, more likely to 
be examples of the replication of existing states.29 Kopytoff attributes replication to exiters 
requiring social acceptance among other states.  Another likely economic reason for 
replication is that new state faced the same unique African conditions (i.e., abundant land, 
scarcity of people, decreasing returns to the broadcast of power and the institution of 
birthright) as the original state.  
Features (5), (6) and (7) provide a more comprehensive social structure of African states 
than in this model.  This model simply distinguishes between the elite and non-elite to show 
that the elite receive surplus shares and are entitled to rule in their own right.  (8) and (9) 
provide the social standing of the ruler.  Again this is simplified in economic terms.  The 
model presented in this chapter shows that the ruler sets tax rates and surplus shares (11) 
And, lastly, while Kopytoff suggests that the exit and creation of new states is a 
social/historical process, this essay instead emphasizes that the creation of new states through 
internal exit is a result of elite members making rational economic calculations regarding 
their surplus shares. 
The creation of new natural states on the African frontier represents a missing link in the 
North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) framework of a state as an organisation of organisations.  
In this framework, the predicted path for state development is from a natural state to an open 
                                                 
29
 Cf. Winter and  Szulanski (2001) 
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access order.  To transition from a natural state to an open-access order, North, Wallis and 
Weingast suggest that three “doorstop conditions” need to be in place: a rule of law for elite 
members, perpetual life for the state, and consolidated control of the military (p. 180-208).  
However, African natural states do not meet any of the doorstop conditions. 
Firstly, rather than an impersonal rule of law among elite members, in African states 
relationships between elite members are personal, based on familial ties. An elite member 
may receive preferential treatment when favoured by the ruler.  But the ruler’s preferences 
can easily change and, when they do, he can have an elite member killed.  As Schapera (1963 
[1956]: 174-175) notes, relationships were fickle, and there was no rule of law that will 
provide an “adequate safeguard against bloodshed” among members of the elite. 
Second, while some states do meet the condition of perpetual life, many do not.  The 
perpetual life of the state is essential to develop impersonal “perpetually lived organisations” 
(p. 151).  These types of organisations include business corporations as well as “political, 
municipal, educational, fraternal, and religious corporations” (p. 152).  In African states the 
institution of birthright makes the perpetual life of the state unattainable.  As birthright 
entitles all elite members to rule, when a ruler dies, many African natural states are bogged 
down in succession arguments between elite members that can destroy the state.  For 
example, while Shaka was a member of the elite, he was not first in line to rule.  However he 
still managed to use force to take over the state from his half-brothers and become the Zulu 
ruler (Krige 1965; Chanaiwa 1980).   As a result of the institution of birthright, many 
southern African natural states did not survive beyond the third or fourth generation of 
succession (Richards 1961). 
Lastly, consolidated military power requires “the existence of an organization with control 
over all the military resources” (p. 153) of the state.  In the African context, in the same way 
that the ruler delegates the power rule to ward leaders, he also typically delegates military 
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power to the same leaders.  Hence military power is diffused among the elite members.  
Therefore many African natural states do not meet the doorstop condition of a consolidated 
military.  The Zulu under Dingane and Zwide (ca. 1970-1818) and later Shaka are an 
exception though.  These rulers consolidated military power.  Instead of organising the 
military along personal or familial lines, the Zulu army was organised into age groups led by 
experienced generals (Chanaiwa 1980).  Since the majority of African states do not meet any 
of the doorstop conditions, and the Zulu state only meets the third one, African natural states 
are unable to progress to open access orders.   
Yet state transitions did take place.  As this essay shows, rather than transitioning between 
different types of orders, new natural states formed from existing natural states.  Hence, the 
North, Wallis and Weingast framework can be extended, based on the African experience, to 
show how new natural states from existing natural states, in particular through the mechanism 
of internal exit.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This essay is a first attempt to build a historically grounded model in which internal exit is a 
state formation mechanism.  In doing so, it contributes to the economic history of Africa by 
providing an economic rationale for the specific experiences of internal exit among 
precolonial southern African States (ca. 1500-1910) such as the Ndebele and the Tawana. 
More precisely, this essay suggests that the internal exit in precolonial southern African 
originates from the surplus share maximising behaviour of members of the elite. 
Additionally, this essay contributes to economic theory in three ways.  Firstly, this essay 
extends the theory of internal exit by exploring the consequences of internal exit when the 
initiator is a member of the elite and the exit involved the physical movement of people.  
Secondly, this essay provides an economic model of Kopytoff’s (1989) frontier social order.  
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Thirdly, this essay extends the North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) framework for a state as an 
organisation of organisations to include the formation of new natural states from existing 
ones.  
While this chapter sheds new light on the phenomenon of internal exit and state formation 
in Africa, it is not without its limitations.  One such limitation is that this model does not 
account for an exit forced by a ruler. The economic rationale for a ruler to force exit and 
actually lose people is beyond the scope of this essay.  Thus an area for future research is one 
that considers other mechanisms of state formation, like forced exit in southern Africa, during 
both the precolonial and early colonial period. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Intergovernmental Grants  
and Local Government Learning 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In his 2004 Presidential Address to the International Schumpeter Society Meeting, Malerba 
(2006) identified four challenges for the research programme of evolutionary economics: 
demand, knowledge, networks, and coevolution.  The purpose of this chapter is to pick up the 
two challenges of knowledge and networks.  However, rather than considering the two 
challenges in the context of industrial economics, as Malerba mainly suggests doing, this 
essay considers the challenges in the context of public economics as learning in a fiscal 
federation.30  In fact, even though Schumpeter is considered also a pioneer for the study of 
public economics, especially in its non-constitutional Public Choice manifestation (Buchanan 
1984), the premise of this essay is that modern economic evolutionary theory has so far paid 
little attention to the potential of a dynamic analysis of the public economy.   
In public economics, one way to view federalism is as a laboratory in which local 
governments help the central government by running experiments simultaneously to solve 
policy problems (e.g., Oates 1999: 1131-4).31  The ‘collective intelligence’ of the federated 
network means that local governments are able to learn from each other’s policy mistakes and 
successes and, ultimately, will generate positive externalities in the form of knowledge 
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 Boschken (1982) is the first to link federations to networks through organisation theory.  For more recent contributions see 
Garzarelli (2004) and Oates (2011). 
31
 All states are fiscally decentralised to some degree: even if a state is de jure unitary, it is de facto decentralised (e.g., 
Breton 2000).  Immediate concrete (democratic) examples include France, Italy, South Africa, and the United Kingdom.  
Cai and Treisman (2009) identify China and the USSR as examples in which dictatorships/centrally planned economies 
manifested decentralisation. This essay is framed in terms of fiscal federalism as this this is the sphere in which the 
literature mostly addresses the subject matter I am concerned with.  However, the analysis is equally valid for unitary 
states with de factor decentralisation.  For this same reason, some of the decentralisation examples cited are from states 
that are de jure unitary. 
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growth for the federation as a whole (e.g., Sabel 2004).  Local policy experiments that prove 
unsuccessful will have a low cost to the federation as a whole, as the experiments are only 
performed on a local level; whereas those experiments that prove successful will have a high 
return as they can be adopted by other governments in the federation (e.g., Kollman, Miller 
and Page 2000).  
Casual empiricism suggests that local governments routinely experiment with policy, 
achieving varying degrees of success.  One example is Mayor Bloomberg’s range of anti-
poverty experiments in New York City (Bosman 2009).   Another example is that of Mayor 
Mockus of Bogotá who introduced many innovative policy experiments.  In one experiment, 
Mayor Mockus employed mimes to direct traffic and to alleviate traffic congestion (Caballero 
2004).32   
This chapter considers laboratory federalism in conjunction with intergovernmental grants, 
the primary fiscal policy tool of decentralisation.  The Public Economics literature on 
intergovernmental grants is extensive (among others, Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld 1979; 
King 1984; Oulasvirta 1997; Mieszkowski and Musgrave 1999).  In this extensive literature, 
grants are usually analysed according to consumer behaviour theory.  These analyses assume 
that grants are spent either according to the preferences of the median voter (e.g., Romer and 
Rosenthal 1980) or according to the preferences of the community as a whole (e.g., Oates 
1972).33  Under these analyses, income and substitution effects determine community 
spending and, ultimately, community welfare.34   
                                                 
32
 US states often implement innovative policies.  For example, Pennsylvania is known for leading policy innovation 
regarding organ donation (Stolberg 1999).  Oregon has experimented different voting systems (Bradbury 2005).  
Numerous states experiment with different forms of corporate law (Romano 2006), and Colorado and Washington State 
are leading experiments in legalising cannabis (Kleiman and Ziskind 2014). 
33
 Another view on grants considers the preferences of only of the grant recipient (Wilde 1968).  This view does not take 
into account the preferences of the community or the preferences of the grant donor.  Brennan and Pincus (1990:130) 
provide an example of a university board that failed to take the preferences of the grant donor into account. 
34
 There are many shortcomings to analysing grants in this way.  For example, the consumer behaviour analysis of 
intergovernmental grants is unable to distinguish between an unconditional lump-sum grant and a conditional lump-sum 
grant (Oates 1972: 77). 
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At the same time, very little literature exists tying policy experimentation with 
intergovernmental grants.  This is somewhat surprising since intergovernmental grants are 
routinely used to stimulate policy experimentation.  In one such example, when the Public 
Safety Department (which consists of both fire and police) of Fairfield, California was 
allowed to keep savings from a lump-sum grant, the Department changed its strategy from 
only fighting fires to fire prevention.  This change in policy lowered the running costs as well 
as improved the insurance rating of the department (Osborne and Gaebler 1993: 225).  
Grants were used for the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) in the United 
States.  SCHIP was introduced in 1997 to improve medical insurance coverage for children.  
SCHIP allocated lump-sum grants to states, which enabled them to design and apply the 
policy in different ways (Weissert and Scheller 2008). Another example is the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) from the United States.  The ACA uses federal 
support in the form of intergovernmental grants to create incentives for states to innovate.  
The results of the policy experiments are evaluated, data is collected and the information is 
made publicly available (Madison 2014: 788-789).35  Other countries also use grant funding 
for policy experimentation.  Public universities in Scotland used lump-sum grant funding to 
successfully experiment with different fees payment policies (Keating 2005a,b).  
Intergovernmental grants have also been used successfully to promote policy diffusion 
(i.e., the transfer of successful policies between governments) in the US.  The federal 
government uses grants either by allocating grants as a reward to those states that implement 
newly developed policies or by withdrawing grants to punish those states that do not 
implement the policies (Welch and Thompson 1980; Allen, Pettus and Haider-Markel 2004).   
                                                 
35
 Policy experimentation is not limited to local governments.  Kerber and Eckardt (2007) consider policy learning through 
from countries in the European Union.  Cai and Treisman’s (2009) model of laboratory federalism assumes that both 
central and local governments can experiment with policy.  Historically, former US President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
encouraged policy experiments at different levels of government during the Great Depression (Rodrik 2014: 204).  
Currently Great Britain’s Prime Minister David Cameron and US President Barack Obama both encourage policy 
experimentation in terms of behavioural interventions at the central level (Bennhold 2013; Social Sciences and Behavioral 
Team 2015).   
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Hence, it seems worthwhile to consider how intergovernmental grants can help local 
governments to perform policy experiments and ultimately learn from them.  Through a 
simple model, this essay shows that a local government grant recipient (e.g., a city manager, 
an Italian regional president, a mayor, a South African provincial premier, a US state 
governor) is likely to experiment more (and also learn more) from a lump-sum grant than a 
closed matching grant because an unconditional lump-sum grant allows greater leeway for 
spending than a closed matching grant.36  This means that grant donors can use different 
types of grants as policy instruments to induce different levels of experimentation at the 
recipient government level.37  An additional implication of the model is that an unconditional 
lump-sum grant can produce greater external benefits in the form of knowledge gains to other 
local governments (and even to the central government) than a closed matching grant. 38   
The model proxies the undertaking of different policy experiments by the local 
government representative using an intergovernmental grant with melioration (Herrnstein and 
Prelec 1991; Herrnstein et al. 1993; Metcalfe 2001).  In its simplest sense, melioration is the 
process of making something better.  In the broad evolutionary economics interpretation, 
melioration is a process in which an economic agent continually allocates resources (e.g., 
time and money) to the best feasible alternative.  Through experimentation with an 
intergovernmental grant, the local government representative, behaving as a meliorator, 
engages in different policy experiments, ultimately allocating more of the grant funding to the 
                                                 
36
 Intergovernmental grants can be given vertically, i.e., from higher level governments to lower ones (or vice versa) or 
horizontally, i.e., between governments on the same level.  Typically (and in this essay) vertical intergovernmental grants 
are transferred from a higher level of government to a lower one.  For a model of the reverse, see Boadway and Keen 
(1996).   
37
 The problem considered here is analogous to the positive version of the traditional soft budget contstraint problem 
discussed by Kornai (1986), Oates (2005), Vigneault (2007), Besfamille and Lockwood (2008), and Weingast (2009), 
among others.  As Osbourne and Gaebler (1993: 135-137) notes, “permission to fail” is critical to innovation in the public 
sector. 
38
 Bednar (2011: 215) also suggests that a federation needs to have sufficient rules in place to tolerate “selfish 
experimentation.”  For example a local government that experiments with legalising cannabis successfully (e.g., in terms 
of economic growth, higher public revenue and lower crime rates) may actually produce negative externalities to those 
states in which the median voter finds drug usage repugnant. This type of externality is also known as a “transcendental 
externality” (Langlois 1982: 295). Clearly, the knowledge gains from “selfish experimentation” will be more limited than 
experimentation on policies that are more likely to be valued throughout the federation (e.g., welfare policies).  
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policy experiment that proves most successful.  Moreover, as a meliorator, the local 
government representative will also put a stop to any policy experiments that prove 
unsuccessful.  Melioration accordingly allows us to capture trial-and-error experimentation.   
 
3.2 Intergovernmental Grants as Policy Instruments for    
Experimentation 
 
The laboratory federalism literature originates from Public Economics and Law and 
Economics (e.g., Rose-Ackerman 1980; Oates 1999; Kollman, Miller and Page 2000; 
Strumpf 2002; Sabel 2004; Kotsogiannis and Schwager 2006; Cai and Treisman 2009; Galle 
and Leahy 2009; Schnyder 2011).   It examines two issues: firstly, whether decentralised 
governments produce more policy experimentation than centralised governments and, 
secondly, the incentives needed to promote experimentation in a decentralised government.   
This essay is concerned with the second issue, i.e. with creating the incentives to promote 
experimentation (see, e.g., Rose-Ackerman 1980, Strumpf 1998, Garzarelli 2006, Bednar 
2011 and Madison 2014). 
Policy experimentation implies a degree of uncertainty.  The local government has to 
implement policy choices which may or may not work.  Strumpf (2002) suggests that one 
reason for a local government not to engage in experimentation is risk aversion.  But when 
the intention of an intergovernmental grant is to promote experimentation, grants can be used 
to cushion unsuccessful experimentation.  By rewarding experimentation, regardless of 
outcome, a local government grant recipient will be able to experiment with policy without 
fear of losing future grants.   
But, as always, there is no free lunch:  with any type of grant comes the implication that 
future grants will be related to how effectively the previous grant is used (Brennan and 
Pincus 1990: 129; Garzarelli 2006: 248).  The rational grant recipient, therefore, has an 
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incentive to use the funds efficiently or else run the risk of not receiving additional grants in 
the future.39  Hence, we can view an intergovernmental grant as an incomplete contract 
between the grant donor (the central government) and the grant recipient (the local 
government) (cf. Brennan and Pincus 1990; Breton 1998[1996]).40  Taking this view suggests 
that an intergovernmental grant is more than simply a transfer payment from the donor to the 
recipient.41  Instead, a grant is able to convey information that the price mechanism fails to 
transmit.  Thus, like any contract, a grant is actually an instrument of exchange between the 
donor and the recipient.   
Traditionally, there are two main categories of intergovernmental grants: conditional and 
unconditional (e.g., King 1984).  For example, a closed matching grant is considered a 
conditional grant while a lump-sum grant is considered an unconditional grant.  For 
conditional grants, the donor places restrictions on the use of the funds; while for 
unconditional grants, the donor does not place any restrictions on the use of the funds.  A 
closed matching grant is classified as a conditional grant which specifies that for each dollar 
spent by the grant recipient on a particular activity, the grant donor will match it with a 
specified sum to a maximum sum of money (e.g., for every one dollar spent by the recipient, 
the donor will contribute fifty cents but to a maximum of two million dollars).42  A lump-sum 
grant is classified as an unconditional grant.  Unconditional lump-sum grants are sums of 
money given with no restriction on the use of funds (e.g., two million dollars). 
                                                 
39
 In the Brennan and Pincus (1990:130) example, the grant recipient (a public university) was punished by the grant donor 
(the government) with a cut in grant funding.  Another example of implicit conditions attached to “unconditional” grants 
comes from South Africa: during an electricity crisis in 2015, the South African National Treasury withheld fiscal 
equalisation grants (which are typically unconditional lump-sum grants) from municipalities which had failed to pay their 
electricity bills (Slabbert 2015).  
40
 An incomplete contract is a contract between two or more parties that contains gaps or missing stipulations (Hart 
1988:123).  An intergovernmental grant could not be viewed as a complete contract as “[a] complete contract would 
specify all relevant contingencies over the life of the contract, foresee a course of action for each of these contingencies, 
deny the…possibility of renegotiation so as not to deprive the original agreement of its credibility, and provide for each 
contingency” (Breton 1998[1996]:214). 
41
 Other views of intergovernmental grants beyond the traditional consumer theory analysis also include Ostrom and Ostrom 
(1965) and Bradford and Oates (1971). 
42
 Matching grants can be either closed-ended or open-ended.  A closed-ended matching grant limits the total amount the 
donor will contribute; while the size of the open-ended matching grant is dependent only on the contribution made by the 
recipient.   
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However, when viewing an intergovernmental grant as an incomplete contract, any grant 
has conditions attached regardless of whether it is a conditional grant or not (Brennan and 
Pincus 1990; Breton 1998[1996]; Garzarelli 2006).  It is simply the case that some of the 
grant conditions are explicit (e.g., a matching ratio and a maximum amount in the case of a 
closed matching grant) while others are implicit (e.g., verbal suggestions) (Brennan and 
Pincus 1990; Breton 1998[1996]).  An unconditional lump-sum grant is only unconditional in 
so far as there are no explicit conditions attached, i.e., implicit conditions will still be 
attached.43  A closed matching grant that is explicitly conditional is also likely to have 
implicit conditions attached.  Hence, a grant donor can use both explicit conditions and 
implicit conditions to direct the spending of a grant.44  Thus, all grants, whether explicitly 
conditional or not, are, in fact, conditional (Brennan and Pincus 1990).  Hence, different 
types of intergovernmental grants can have different degrees of conditionality.  For example, 
as a lump-sum grant only has implicit conditions attached, it is relatively less conditional than 
a closed matching grant, which has both explicit and implicit conditions attached. 
The inverse of grant conditionality is the leeway or discretion left to the grant recipient:  a 
grant with a high degree of conditionality will allow very little leeway, while a grant with a 
relatively low degree of conditionality will have greater leeway.  Thus, an unconditional 
lump-sum grant has relatively more leeway as compared to a conditional closed matching 
grant, and vice versa.45  Garzarelli (2006:249) suggests that this leeway can “serve as a policy 
tool. It can be used by a central government in a federation to induce different levels of 
                                                 
43
 As Breton (1987[1985]: 315) indicates, “[u]nconditionality…is the product of a reliance on a theory of intergovernmental 
grants in which the decision makers are neither real governments, nor competitive.”   
44
 It’s unlikely that a grant donor will provide grant funds without any conditions at all because, like the recipient, the donor 
is also subject to political constraints (Brennan and Pincus 1990: 137).   
45
 When experimentation is not required, a grant donor and a grant recipient often have preferences for grant spending.  The 
donor or central government prefers to promote those policies that it views as important, e.g., those that generate positive 
externalities and merit goods.  Thus, a donor will prefer a grant with explicit conditions attached, e.g., a matching grant. In 
contrast, the recipient or local government prefers to have leeway to spend the funds according to local preferences.  Thus, 
a recipient will prefer a grant with as few explicit conditions as possible, e.g., an unconditional lump-sum grant (Oulasvirta 
1997: 401). 
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experimentation from its local governments.”46 A grant that is less complete (an 
unconditional lump-sum grant) allows more leeway for the recipient to engage in policy 
experimentation than a grant that is relatively more complete (a closed matching grant).47  
Moreover, a local government grant recipient who chooses not to engage in 
experimentation will be held accountable by both the donor and its citizens.48   The donor can 
punish the grant recipient by increasing grants to other local governments.  The citizens of the 
local community will recognize that they have lost out on these grants and will hold the local 
government grant recipient responsible (Goodspeed 2002: 418-419).49   
For example, when Norway replaced conditional grants with unconditional lump-sum 
grants in 1986, Carlsen (1995:56) found that local government grant recipients had an 
incentive to “use spending decisions as strategic instruments to achieve additional grants.”  
The reason for this incentive is that the Norwegian public believed that the behaviour of the 
local grant recipients could be the reason for future grant reductions.  Thus, if fewer grants 
were received, the public would hold the local grant recipient responsible in the next local 
election. 50 
Even when there is imperfect information, there are incentives for both the grant donor 
and the grant recipient to uphold the conditions of a grant.  The conditionality attached to a 
grant creates political rents for both the grant donor and the grant recipient.51  Provided the 
                                                 
46
 Bednar (2011) also suggests grants to create incentives to experiment but does not discuss the relative conditionality issue 
raised by both Strumpf (1998) and Garzarelli (2006). 
47
 The conditionality associated with grants to induce policy experimentation also means that intergovernmental grants 
effectively ‘soften’ the budget constraint of the local government.  This is because the rational grant recipient understands 
that future grants can be expected once the current grant has been used for policy experimentation.  Thus, the central 
government can use future intergovernmental grants to both encourage and reward experimentation.  The positive 
incentives created by soft budget constraints have not been examined in the literature.  Typically, a soft budget constraint 
is considered harmful to a federation as it creates perverse incentives for local governments to overspend (e.g., Kornai 
1986; Oates 2005; Vigneault 2007; Weingast 2006). 
48
 Such accountability will avoid problems of transfer dependence (Rodden 2003; Oates 2008). 
49
 Volden (1999: 73) finds that grant recipients do respond to the incentives created by intergovernmental grants but the 
nature of response depends on institutions of recipient government. 
50
 Additionally, local governments compete with each other to get grants from higher levels of government (Salmon 2005:3).  
Moreover, Callander and Harstad (2013) suggest that local governments compete with each other when it’s likely that one 
of their policy innovations will be adopted by the central government. 
51
 One way that local governments generate political rents for central governments is when the local governments “hire” the 
central governments to collect taxes.  The central government has economies of scale in preventing both tax avoidance and 
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conditions attached to a grant generate sufficient rents for both the grant donor (the central 
government) and for the grant recipient (the local government), then neither the donor nor the 
recipient will wish to lose out on these rents.  Hence, both the local government and the 
central government will have incentives to uphold the contractual terms of the grant and, in 
this case, to use the grant funding effectively to experiment with policy (Breton 1998[1996]: 
214-219). 
Now consider how a local government grant recipient, behaving as a meliorator, uses an 
intergovernmental grant to experiment with policies.  Subsequently, this chapter analyses 
how different types of grants (e.g. a closed matching grant compared to a lump-sum grant) 
can engender different levels of experimentation and, hence, learning.  
 
3.3 Local Government Learning 
Creating new, successful policies is difficult (e.g., Lindblom 1959, 1979).  Often, policy 
experimentation is needed because policy makers do not necessarily have the knowledge of 
which policy will produce a desired objective (Callander 2011b).  For example, in the case of 
legalising cannabis in the US, Kleiman and Ziskind (2014: 78) note, “[g]iven the range of 
potential gains and losses, and of policy options, the probability of finding the perfect 
combination right from the start must surely be near zero.  Thus, the best initial policy will 
not be the one that comes closest to some calculated optimum, but instead the one easiest to 
adjust in light of experience, which among other things means building in evaluation and 
policy feedback mechanisms.” 
Evolutionary theory is especially useful to study instances where agents are not explicitly 
optimising, such as when policy makers are attempting policy innovation (Nelson and Winter 
                                                                                                                                                        
tax evasion.  Thus, the local government will be in a position to transfer political rents to the central government when the 
cost of collecting taxes locally (i.e., without economies of scale) is greater than the sum of the cost of collecting taxes 
centrally and the cost of creating the political rents (Breton 1998[1996]: 214-219). 
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1977).  Hence, this essay uses tools of evolutionary theory to help to enrich the understanding 
of how local governments experiment with policy and how the experimentation leads to 
learning.52  
Learning is not a perfect process.  As Arrow (1962:155) indicates, “[l]earning is the 
product of experience.  Learning can only take place through the attempt to solve a problem 
and therefore only takes place during activity.” Because experimentation and innovation 
involve a degree of uncertainty, it is difficult for a policy maker to choose the correct policy 
straight away.  This is especially true when the problem itself is not easy to formulate.  
Hence, learning from experimentation implies some degree of mistakes (see, e.g., Nelson and 
Winter 1977 and Callander 2011a).53  In spite of the mistakes, though, the concept of learning 
does imply that the policy maker will make an improvement, over a period of time, from 
poorer policy choices to better choices.54   
As an evolutionary process, learning requires three mechanisms, namely selection, 
variation and retention.  Consider each of these mechanisms in turn.  Selection is a 
“mechanism providing differential rewards and penalties” (Dosi, Marengo and Fagiolo 2005: 
318).  In the context of learning at the local government level, selection is the act of choosing 
the most appropriate policy from the available policy options (Forte 1982: 234).55  Each 
policy option under consideration for experimentation should have an associated value or 
reward function attached to it that provides a guide to selecting the most appropriate policy 
                                                 
52Callander (2011b) and Callander and Hummel (2014) model experimentation and learning in the context of policies, 
though not necessarily at the local government level. 
53
 Note that a good policy is considered one that achieves the objectives desired by society.  However, a policy that is a 
mistake is not necessarily a policy that does not achieve the objectives desired by society.  Instead, a policy that is a 
mistake means that there is another policy that would be preferred (Lindblom 1959:83). 
54
 Cf. Börgers and Sarin (1997). 
55
 There are two types of selection in the evolutionary literature, namely natural selection and artificial selection.  Natural 
selection takes place without human intervention, while artificial selection occurs when humans manipulate the “criteria or 
environment of selection; the selection process is under the control of a human agent” (Hodgson and Knudsen 2010: 
Section 3.2 Paragraph 2).    Following Hodgson and Knudsen (2010), this chapter does not separate out these two forms of 
selection because, in spite of human intervention, institutions are still exposed to both competition and natural events.  
Thus, some institutions may persist while others may not.  For more on artificial selection see Commons (2009[1934]).  
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(Dosi and Nelson 1994: 154).56   Thus, the policy options are competing with each other, and 
each policy option will be considered in terms of its value relative to the values of the other 
policies.57   
Variation takes place when the local government switches between policies. The local 
government representative experiments by choosing a policy with the highest value, relative 
to the mean value of all the available policy options, and switches between the policies 
depending on the relative values for each policy (Dosi, Marengo and Fagiolo 2005).  The act 
of switching between the policy options is known as variation.58  Selection works together 
with variation to choose the better policy options, and making the less successful policies 
redundant (Hodgson and Knudsen 2010: Section 2.1).  Thus, learning at the local government 
level takes place by the combination of selection and variation among the various policy 
options.59   
Consequently, through selection and variation, learning allows for multiple equilibria.  
Hence, there can be multiple stable policy choices (Dosi and Nelson 1994: 154; Dosi, 
Marengo and Fagiolo 2005: 294).  Thus, different local governments, even if homogeneous, 
may find different policy solutions for the same problem.   
The final step in local government learning is retention.  Retention takes place when a 
successful policy is kept or retained when it has a higher value – it generates more benefits or 
achieves the same results at lower costs, for example – relative to the other available policy 
options (Vanberg and Kerber 1994).  Another form of retention is policy diffusion, i.e., when 
                                                 
56
 This is similar to Lancaster’s (1966) notion of a characteristic vector that determines the consumption of a particular good. 
57
 It is the competition between experimental policies that leads to new policy development (See Saviotti and Mani (1995) 
for a parallel in technological innovation).   
58
 Variation is essential to learning as policy makers, “must anticipate the possibility of a reconsideration of their situation, a 
reformulation of their problems, and a change of strategies in light of experience and new information. The condition of 
human fallibility requires analysis, reason, deliberation, choice, experience, reconsideration, and an opportunity to alter, 
amend, or change as new information and new understanding give rise to new possibilities” (Ostrom 2008: Chapter 2, 
Paragraph 35).  See also Börgers and Sarin (1997).   
59
 Note that pure selection implies no learning as it relies solely on random switching behaviour.   Instead of considering the 
value of each policy option, pure selection means that a local government official will pick a policy arbitrarily without 
taking into account past experience or whether the policy will be successful (Dosi, Marengo and Fagiolo 2005: 318-319).     
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the successful policy is reproduced by other governments (Hodgson and Knudsen 2010: 
Section 1.7). 
 
3.4 Melioration as Learning 
To understand how the grant recipient learns by experimenting with grant funding, we 
consider the recipient’s behaviour upon receiving a grant.  As Brennan and Pincus (1990: 
136) note, “[i]f the grant is in any way contingent on the recipient's behavior (either the 
making of the grant at all or its size), then the grant tends to induce behavioural responses in 
(potential) recipients.”   On receipt of a grant, the rational behaviour of the local government 
representative will be to take policy actions tied to the grant (e.g., constructing a new road, 
reviving a local park).   
One way to capture experimentation and learning at the local government level is as if it 
takes place through melioration (e.g., Herrnstein and Prelec 1991; Herrnstein et al. 1993; 
Metcalfe 2001).  Melioration is “the process of choosing that alternative among the set of 
alternatives which currently has the higher yield in (value)” (Herrnstein et al 1993: 150).  The 
local government representative, behaving as a meliorator, engages in different experiments 
simultaneously to find a solution to a problem.  For example, different experiments to reduce 
crime can be tried in different boroughs of a city.  Through these experiments, the local 
government official will switch his preference for the best policy solution depending on the 
value functions attached to each experiment. 
Melioration is different but related to the traditional utility maximisation framework.  In a 
maximisation framework, alternative policies are articulated together so that they lose their 
individuality, that is, only the utility attached to the whole choice bundle matters in a typical 
community iso-welfare function.  Instead, melioration requires that the utility be unbundled 
and attached to each individual policy so that each policy can be considered separately.  This 
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unbundled utility or disaggregated welfare is referred to as the value of the policy (Herrnstein 
and Pralec 1991: 154-155). 60 
The value of a policy may encompass attributes of the policy (such as compatibility and 
observability) and can include knowledge of how successful that policy has been in other 
local policy experiments.  The value can also include any rents captured by implementing the 
policy.  
The local government representative will always choose the policy with the highest value 
relative to any other policy options.  If the policy continues to prove successful, the policy 
will continue to have the highest value of possible polices and the local government will 
retain the policy.  If the policy does not prove successful, then the value of the policy will fall 
and when another policy has a higher value relative to that policy, the local government will 
switch to a different policy.   Thus, implementing a chosen policy can have positive or 
negative effects on the relative value of the available policy options.  In other words, the 
values associated with the policy options change endogenously during melioration.  
Melioration can continue up to the point where funds are used up or to the point at which the 
average value of the alternative policies is equal.61   
Thus, melioration is appropriate to model experimentation and learning at the local 
government level because it encompasses the three mechanisms of evolutionary learning that 
we discussed, namely selection, variation, and retention.  Under melioration a policy will be 
selected on the value (i.e., disaggregated welfare) attached to that policy.  Variation takes 
place when a policy with a higher value will replace a policy with a lower value.  A policy 
that maintains a higher value than any other policies will be retained. 
                                                 
60
 For more on the policy attributes see Makse and Volden (2011).  Osborne and Gaebler (1993: 141-142) provide examples 
in the US in which output or results are measured to determine the success or failure of a policy.   
61
 The point at which the average value of the alternative policies is equal is the meliorator’s equilibrium where the local 
government representative is indifferent between different policies as they all have the same value (Herrnstein and Pralec 
1991). 
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To illustrate melioration, consider how a local government representative switches in 
preference between two policies, ;. and ;/, to solve the problem of potholes on local roads.  
In this illustration, ;. may involve simply fixing each pothole individually, while ;/ may 
involve re-tarring the roads where there are potholes.62  Suppose that there are two identical 
areas within the local community and that each policy is tested in a different area. 
Each policy,	;*, has a corresponding value function R*(x), which is the amount of 
satisfaction perceived to be obtained from ;* given ; = (;.,;/).  R.(x) is the value of ;. 
which is a faster, short-run solution with little inconvenience to drivers on the road; R/(x) is 
the value of ;/ from a long-run solution because the potholes will not reappear.  The 
weighted mean of the values is R̅(x) = ∑ ;*U-/*-. R*(x).  The value function indicates relative 
preferences for different policies: R.(x) > R/(x) ⇔ ;. ≻ ;/, and R.(x) < R/(x) ⇔ ;. ≺ ;/.   
As mentioned, the value function provides feedback to the local government 
representative as to the relative success or failure of the policy chosen.  Thus, the local 
government representative is aware of both value functions and their mean.  Accordingly, the 
local representative is able to compare the two policies based on their relative values. 
As previously indicated, selecting from the alternative policies can have positive or 
negative effects on the relative value of the policy.  If the relative value of that policy starts to 
decline, and falls below the relative value of another policy, the recipient will “switch” to or 
prefer the policy with a higher value. The changes in the relative values of the different 
policies provide the feedback for the recipient.  Hence, the change in value function  3YZ(#)Z 5 
indicates whether a policy’s value is increasing or decreasing.  That is to say that if a policy 
experiment proves unsuccessful it will have a decreasing value function 3YZ(#)Z < 05; 
whereas if a policy experiment proves successful it will have an increasing value function 
                                                 
62
 An example of an innovation to solve the pothole problem in Johannesburg, South Africa is a smartphone application that 
allows a citizen to report a pothole problem with both the GPS coordinates of the location and a photograph of the pothole 
(“JRA plans to fix problems in a day” 2015). 
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3YZ(#)Z > 05.   A policy can also have a constant value function 3YZ(#)Z = [5 if the value of 
the policy remains unchanged. 
Suppose the local government receives a grant with which to experiment.  The local 
government representative is tasked with spending the grant.  Acting as a meliorator, the local 
government representative will always first choose that policy that has the highest value of 
the two policy choices.  The values of the two policies are R.(x) and R/(x).  As the 
experiment progresses, with more information about the relative success or failure of the 
experimental policy, the values of the two policies will change.63 
Figure 3.1 shows how the value functions of the policies change relative to each other.  
Initially, policy 2 has a higher value than policy 1.  However, the value of policy 2 is 
declining (Y(#) < 0) and the value of policy 1 is increasing (Y2(#)2 > 0).  Then at ME1 the 
values of policy 1 and policy 2 are equal (R.(x) = R/(x)).  Since the value of policy 2 is 
declining and the value of policy 1 is increasing, at ME1 the local government representative 
will also experiment with policy 1.  The value of policy 1 continues to increase (Y2(#)2 > 0), 
but at a decreasing rate (Y2(#)2 < 0), then falls (Y2(#)2 < 0), while the value of policy 2 
begins to rise again (Y(#) > 0).  At ME2, the values of both policies are equal (i.e., R.(x) =
R/(x)).  Thus, ME2 is another switching point, and, since the value of policy 1 is declining 
and the value of policy 2 is increasing, the local government representative switches back to 
policy 2, which has the higher value beyond ME2.   
Melioration continues as long as funds are available, namely until the grant funding runs 
out.  The number of times the local government representative switches between the available 
                                                 
63
 From Herrnstein’s (1974) matching law, since ;* represent responses and if we consider that the value functions R*(x) act 
as reinforcements, then 22\ = Y2(#)Y2(#)\Y(#), and, hence,2 = Y2(#)Y(#).   
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policies is an indication of the number of experiments undertaken, and, therefore, the extent 
of the learning that has taken place.   
 
Figure 3.1 Melioration between Two Policy Choices  
  
Figure 3.1 also shows a “learning path” along which policies will be implemented based 
on the value functions.  Throughout melioration, the relatively more successful policy (as 
determined by the value function) will be implemented.  Clearly, though, if the initial policy 
is successful, and maintains a value higher than the other policy choice, then there will be no 
need to try out a second experiment or to switch between the two policies at all.  Conversely, 
if the initial policy is unsuccessful, the local representative can realise the mistake and correct 
it before the mistake becomes too costly. 
Melioration is thus a trial-and-error process of selecting policy experiments that may 
prove successful or unsuccessful. 64  Only those policy experiments that prove successful will 
be retained. Melioration therefore reduces the choice set available to the policy representative 
to only those policy choices where the relative value is higher than the mean of the relative 
                                                 
64
 While economists (e.g., Dur 2001) may be concerned that government representatives may stick with their mistakes rather 
than admit failure to retain votes, political scientists (e.g., Volden 2007) finds that representatives actually do abandon 
unsuccessful policies and adopt more promising policies.   
R.(]) > R/(]) 
  
R/(]) > R.(]) 
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values.  Consequently, it is possible to remove some of the possible policy choice mistakes, 
though not all. For example, if the value of a policy falls to zero, that policy will be 
abandoned completely.  Melioration, thus, encompasses the concept of learning because, 
through adjustments to the value functions, the local representative ultimately reduces the 
mistakes and improves on the policy choices.65 
 
3.5 Intergovernmental Grants: Leeway to Experiment 
Assume there are two levels of government: central and local.  The central government is the 
intergovernmental grant donor and the local government is the intergovernmental grant 
recipient.  More specifically, within the local government, there is a local government 
representative who is a representative agent of the local community.  The local government 
representative is interested in maximising political rents, and, thus, is not a perfect 
representative of the median voter.  Instead, we can think of the local government 
representative as a rule follower (e.g., Langlois 1998) who has incentives to uphold the 
contractual terms of the grant.  In this case the local government representative understands 
that she should use the grant funding effectively to experiment with policy to maximise rents.   
Any public spending by the local government representative is limited by the local 
community’s budget constraint.  Initially, the local community budget constraint depends 
only on taxes raised from the local community.  Assume there is no local government 
borrowing and taxes both at the local level and at the central level remain constant. 
                                                 
65
 For simplicity, this model shows melioration as a static process in which time is exogenous.  However, like all 
evolutionary processes, there is a time component.  It takes time for the local government representative to implement a 
policy experiment and to evaluate the experiment’s success or failure.  To extend this analysis, melioration can be 
described by a simple dynamic replicator equation, ^_` = a^*(b* , ;*)(R*(x) − R̅(x)), which shows the change in the share of 
income direct to a policy ;* over time, ^_`.  ^_` ≥ 0 is the share of income over time directed to the policy ;*, where & = 1,2. a is the rate of switching between policies. Melioration will take place provided	a > 0.  Thus, a determines the extent of 
learning.  (R*(x) − R̅(x)) is the difference between the value of the policy chosen R*(x) and the mean of the policy values R̅(x).   Thus, the share of income directed to policy ;* over time will increase provided a > 0, ^* > 0, and R*(x) > R̅(x).  
Underlying this equation is the principle that as the average reward for a successful policy increases, so too does the share 
of income assigned to it.  The replicator equation shows that as time progresses, learning and experience alter the structure 
of policy experimentation, leading to local efficiency gains (see, e.g., Loewenstein 2010). 
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Assume that the local representative has local public budget d to spend.  Suppose, also, 
that the local representative can choose to spend the local budget on two policies, ;. and ;/.  
The initial budget constraint is, 
J.;. + J/;/ = d,          (1) 
where J*	is the price paid to implement policy ;*, where & = 1,2.   
We can rearrange equation (1) to provide the share of the budget that is assigned to each 
policy as follows (Metcalfe 2001): 
e2f ;. + ef ;/ = 1.         (2) 
Let  
b. = e2f 	, and           (3) 
b/ = ef ,          (4) 
where b* is the share of income devoted to policy ;*.  Thus, the local budget constraint can 
also be expressed as,  
b.;. + b/;/ = 1.         (5) 
 
3.5.1 Melioration with a Lump-Sum Grant 
Suppose that the central government provides the local government with a lump-sum grant, 
(
g).  The budget constraint becomes, 
J.;. + J/;/ = d + 
g        (6) 
Rearranging, 
e2f\h ;. + ef\h ;/ = 1,         (7) 
where b* = eZf\h          
Proceeding along the lines of Herrnstein and Prelec (1991) and Metcalfe (2001), the 
melioration equilibrium can be specified with match
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R.(;., ;/) = R/(;., ;/),        (8) 
in which the values of both policies are equal, and  
b.;. + b/;/ = 1,          (9) 
and where the budget (including the lump-sum grant) is spent.    
Taking total differentials of the matching condition, the system of adjustments that result 
from the lump-sum grant can be represented as, 
ijR.j;.
jR/j;/b. b/ k l
L;.L;/m = i
01d + 
g L
gk. 
Solving the system of adjustments yields 
2h =
nonp∆(f\h) > 0, and         (10) 
h =
no2np2∆(f\h) > 0,         (11) 
where ∆= b/ Y22 + b. Y.         
Equations (10) and (11) show that an increase in 
g results in an increase in policy 
experimentation on both policies.  Any decision to choose between experimenting on policy 1 
or policy 2 depends only on the changes to the relative values of both policies and the size of 
the budget.  Hence, the local government representative can choose freely between either of 
the two policy options, and can meliorate between the two until the lump-sum grant is used 
up. 
 
3.5.2 Melioration with a Closed Matching Grant 
Suppose that the central government provides the local government with a closed matching 
grant (
r) with the explicit condition that it be spent on ;., i.e. the closed matching grant 
increases the spending on ;. by making it relatively cheaper.  Let the closed matching grant 
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rate be s, where 0 < s < 1.  So, for example, if the central government decides to give 50% 
of what the local government has spent on the public policy as a grant, then s = 0.5.  Let 

r = sJ.;..  Thus the budget constraint becomes, 
J.;. + J/;/ = d + 
r,        (12) 
which, again, can be rearranged as  
e2f\u ;. + ef\u ;/ = 1        (13) 
where b* = eZf\u.          
Once again, proceeding along the lines of Herrnstein and Prelec (1991) and Metcalfe (2001), 
the melioration equilibrium can be specified with matching conditions,   
R.(;., ;/) = R/(;., ;/),        (14) 
in which the values of both policies are equal, and  
b.;. + b/;/ = 1,          (15) 
and where the budget (including the closed matching grant) is spent.    
The system of adjustments that result from a closed matching grant can be represented as, 
vY22 Yb. b/ w l
L;.L;/m = l 0(d + 
r)L
rm. 
Solving the system of adjustments for a closed matching grant yields  
2u =
nonp∆(f\u) =
nonp∆(f\e22) > 0, and       (16) 
u =
no2np2∆(f\u) =
no2np2∆(f\e22) > 0,       (17) 
where ∆= b/ Y22 + b. Y.         
Equations (16) and (17) are both positive.  This means that a closed matching grant to one 
policy can increase experimentation on both policies in absolute terms.  However, if we 
compare equation (10) with equation (16) and equation (11) with equation (17), the change in 
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expenditure on both policies is dependent on the grant-aided policy, ;..  This means that 
although experimentation can increase, the experimentation is constrained by the 
commitment of the grant recipient to honour the matching condition of the grant.  Hence, the 
matching condition can, in effect, crowd out experimentation on a policy that it is not 
specifically intended for.  The lump-sum grant has no such restrictions.  Hence, this 
illustration shows that a lump-sum grant provides the grant recipient with greater leeway to 
experiment through melioration than a closed matching grant of the same size.  
 
3.5.3 Graphical Comparison of Melioration under Different Grants 
The learning effects of a lump-sum grant compared to a closed matching grant can also be 
shown graphically.  In Figure 3.2, the closed matching grant-aided policy, ;., is on the 
horizontal axis and an alternative policy, ;/, is on the vertical axis.  The local community 
budget constraint in the absence of intergovernmental grants is represented by AB.   We can 
think of the budget constraint as a boundary of spending by the local community determined 
by local public fund-raising efforts (e.g., local taxes). 
Similarly, we can consider the budget line that incorporates an intergovernmental grant as 
another boundary, the shape of the boundary is dictated by the type of grant.  DF represents 
the shift in the budget constraint due to the lump-sum grant which has no explicit conditions 
attached (Equation 7). AMF represents the shift in the budget constraint due to the closed 
matching grant (Equation 13), which specifies the matching rate s for which the local 
government’s spending on closed matching grant-aided policy, ;.. 
When a local community receives a grant, the outward shift of the budget constraint 
together with the initial budget constraint defines a space in which the local representative 
can experiment with policies:  for a lump-sum grant (DF) the space is ABFD and for a closed 
matching grant (AMF) the space is ABFM.   The experimentation with the grant by the local 
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representative will also be constrained by the initial level of local government spending at x.  
Assume the prices of the policy experiments remain unchanged by undertaking the 
experiment. 
First, consider the lump-sum grant (DF).  Upon receipt of DF, the local representative can 
experiment by meliorating between whichever policy (;. or ;/) has the higher value until the 
lump-sum grant is spent, viz. (along line LM). Thus, the potential space for experimenting 
between policies for a lump-sum grant is represented by the area ILM. 
Now consider the closed matching grant (AMF).  Upon receipt of AMF, the local 
representative can, as for the lump-sum grant, choose how to spend the closed matching grant 
but now has to keep to the conditions attached to the closed matching grant.  The local 
representative can experiment though meliorating between the two policies (;. and ;/) until 
the closed matching grant is spent (i.e., along the line NM).  The conditions attached to the 
closed matching grant crowd out some of the potential to experiment in comparison to the 
lump-sum grant. Thus, the potential for switching between policies for a closed matching 
grant is represented by the area, INM, which is smaller than ILM. 
As shown in Figure 3.2, the closed matching grant conditions crowd out potential 
melioration and, thus, policy experimentation.  The extent to which the potential 
experimentation is crowded out is represented by area NLM which is the difference between 
ILM (i.e., the area for potential experimentation by melioration for a lump-sum grant) and 
INM (i.e., the area for potential experimentation by melioration for a closed matching grant). 
We can thus think of the two areas, ILM and NLM, representing the potential for learning 
from both grants.  Since ILM is the bigger area, a lump-sum grant with no explicit conditions 
has greater potential for learning through experimentation.  The conditions attached to a 
closed matching grant limits the freedom of the local representation to choose between 
potential policies and, thus, crowds out potential learning through experimentation. 
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While the graphical representation of the learning effects is static, it has the benefit of 
indicating the learning potential of these two types of intergovernmental grants by extending 
the traditional analysis of intergovernmental grants.  See Appendix 3A for two near-corner 
examples. 
 
Figure 3.2  Learning under a Lump-sum Grant compared to a Closed 
Matching Grant 
 
 
Notes: The initial level of local government spending is at x where (;., ;/) = (;.y, ;/y).  Upon receipt of a 
lump-sum grant (DF), the local representative can choose whether to spend the grant solely on ;. (i.e., to 
point M where (;., ;/) = (;.., ;/y)); on ;/ (i.e., to point L where (;., ;/) = (;.y, ;//)); or on a combination of  ;. and ;/ (i.e., along the line LM).  Starting with whichever policy (;. or ;/) has the higher initial value, the 
local representative can meliorate between the two policies until the lump-sum grant is spent, i.e., along line 
LM. Thus, the potential for switching between policies for a lump-sum grant is represented by the area, ILM.  
Upon receipt of the closed matching grant (AMF), the local representative can, as for the lump-sum grant, 
choose how to spend the closed matching grant but now has to keep within the conditions attached to the 
closed matching grant. Only if the local representative chooses to spend the closed matching grant solely on ;. (i.e., to point M where (;., ;/) = (;.., ;/y)), then the size of the grant will be the same as the lump-sum 
grant.   If the local representative chooses to spend the closed matching grant solely on ;/, she will only be 
able to spend to point N (i.e., where (;., ;/) = (;.y, ;/.)).  Hence the matching conditions have the potential 
to crowd out ;// − ;/. spending on ;/.  As for the lump-sum grant, starting with whichever policy, ;. or ;/, 
has the higher initial value the local representative can meliorate between the two policies until the closed 
matching grant is spent (i.e., along line NM). Thus, the potential for switching between policies for a closed 
matching grant is represented by the area, INM. 
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3.6 Summary and Areas for Future Research 
This chapter contributes to the laboratory federalism literature by showing how 
intergovernmental grants can be used to induce policy experimentation and which types of 
intergovernmental grants will be most appropriate for this purpose.  The field of laboratory 
federalism has developed largely independently of the theory of intergovernmental grants.  
As we saw, one issue that laboratory federalism is concerned with is how to create incentives 
for local governments to experiment with policy (see, e.g., Rose-Ackerman 1980, Strumpf 
1998, Garzarelli 2006, Bednar 2011 and Madison 2014).  However, as noted by Garzarelli 
(2006), the field has been missing a policy instrument to create those incentives.  Thus, as 
Garzarelli (2006) suggests, and as the model presented in this chapter shows, the field of 
laboratory federalism can be extended to view intergovernmental grants as the missing policy 
instrument to incentivise experimentation.   
The traditional approach to intergovernmental grants suggests two main recommendations 
for grants.  The first prescribes lump-sum grants to address fiscal imbalances between 
governments.  The second prescribes matching grants (either closed- or open-ended) to 
internalise interjurisdictional externalities, i.e., a matching grant is equivalent to a Pigouvian 
subsidy (e.g., Oates 1972; King 1984).  This chapter extends the possible applications for 
intergovernmental grants to policy experimentation.  As shown, a grant with relatively fewer 
conditions attached, such as a lump-sum grant, is the policy instrument of choice to 
incentivise local government learning.  SCHIP is an example where a lump-sum grant gave 
different states the flexibility to experiment with different policy applications and where the 
federal government learned from these experiments to later develop federal legislation 
(Weissert and Scheller 2008). Similarly, in the case of Scottish university funding, Keating 
(2005a,b) suggests that the lump-sum grants allocated allowed the universities to experiment 
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and find new policy solutions that were later adopted by English universities.66  Lump-sum 
grants and closed matching grants are not the only two types of grants though.  The analysis 
here can be extended to other types of intergovernmental grants that fall in between these two 
grants in terms of leeway as well, e.g., a conditional lump-sum grant or an open-ended 
matching grant. 
It is against this backdrop that this chapter shows one possible application of evolutionary 
theory to public economics.  Evolutionary theory has thus far been applied in many economic 
contexts such as technological change in both organisations and industries, as well as in 
economic growth (see, e.g., Nelson and Winter 1977, 2002; Dosi 1988; Boulding 1991; 
Saviotti and Mani 1995; Metcalfe 2001; Consoli 2008; Dopfer 2013).   More recently, 
evolutionary theory has been applied to issues of public policy too (e.g., Wilson and Gowdy 
2013).  However, the application of evolutionary theory to the field of public economics has 
been lacking.  
In this chapter, experimentation with policy is modelled through the evolutionary process 
of melioration.  Melioration was first used to model both animal and human behaviour 
(Herrnstein 1974).  It was later used in consumption models as an alternative to utility 
maximisation (Herrnstein and Prelec 1991; Herrnstein et al. 1993; Metcalfe 2001; Consoli 
2008).  The model presented in this chapter uses melioration differently.  This model extends 
the application of melioration by using it as a proxy for the trial-and-error process of 
undertaking different policy experiments.  As this model shows, experimenting with policy 
by melioration encompasses selection, variation and retention. One way that retention takes 
place is when the experimenting local government keeps using the most successful policy.  
Another way that retention takes place is when other governments in the federation (e.g., 
                                                 
66
 See Appendix 3B for more on how other local governments adopt successful policies. 
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other local governments or even the central government) learn from the experiments and start 
to adopt the successful policies.   
When governments in a federation learn from each other’s policy experiments, we can 
view the federation as a network for knowledge creation.  Thus, within a federation, the 
central government can use grants strategically either to direct multiple local governments to 
experiment with different policy solutions to the same problem or to direct multiple local 
governments to experiment to solve different problems.  
The experiments can generate knowledge of both successful and unsuccessful policies.  
The knowledge of both can be valuable to the federation:  successful policies can be 
replicated, and the repeating of unsuccessful policies can be avoided.  Thus, the results of all 
experiments can generate positive externalities in the form of improved policy knowledge for 
the rest of the federation.  The the model presented in this chapter finds that there is greater 
potential for experimentation from a lump-sum grant than from a closed matching grant: a 
result of this finding is that there is potential for a larger knowledge externality to be 
generated from a lump-sum grant than from a closed matching grant.  
An area in which to extend this research would be the flypaper effect, in particular the 
micro flypaper effect.67  The micro effect considers the different effects that different types of 
intergovernmental grants have on local government spending.  For example, a conditional 
lump-sum grant is typically more stimulating for that public good for which it is intended 
than a conditional closed matching grant (Brennan and Pincus 1990: 134-136).  In a 
meliorating framework, the flypaper effect is likely explained by money sticking to those 
policies that prove successful (or at least are attached to higher value functions than other 
available policies). 
                                                 
67
 For a review of the flypaper literature see Bailey and Connolly (1998).  Brennan and Pincus (1990) suggest a distinction 
between macro and micro flypaper effects.  The macro flypaper effect is more well-known and is the phenomenon in 
which an intergovernmental grant leads to greater public spending than an equivalent increase in community income, e.g. a 
tax cut.   
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As this is a start in considering an evolutionary view of public economics, specifically in 
the field of laboratory federalism, the scope for research is wide open.  One possibility is to 
evaluate the evolutionary imbalance hypothesis in the context of policy experimentation to 
determine whether competitive local governments produce more successful polices than less 
competitive ones.  
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Appendix 3A 
Two Extreme Cases of Grant Experimentation 
 
The area for potential experimentation under a lump-sum grant, ILM, depends on the size of 
the grant and the initial point of consumption I.  The area for potential experimentation under 
a closed matching grant, INM, depends on the matching ratio, size of the grant, and the initial 
point of consumption I.  Consider now two extreme cases shown in Figure 3A.1 and Figure 
3A.2.   
 
Figure 3A.1 Closed Matching Grant Conditions Crowd-Out 
Experimentation 
 
 
 
Figure 3A.1 shows a near corner solution68 at which the local representative has chosen to 
spend very little on the grant-aided policy initially at point I.  In this case, with a closed 
matching grant the area of possible experimentation by melioration is very small, i.e., INR.  
A lump-sum grant, however, will allow the same scope for experimentation as in Figure 3.2, 
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 Intergovernmental grant analysis is usually restricted to interior solutions (see, e.g., King 1984). 
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represented by the area ILM.  Since the initial spending on the grant-aided policy is so low, 
much of the possible additional experimentation is crowded out by the close matching grant 
conditions. 
Figure 3A.2 shows another near corner solution. However, this time the local 
representative has chosen to spend very little on any policy other than the grant-aided policy.  
In this case, though, the closed matching grant can provide as much flexibility in the scope 
for experimenting as the lump-sum grant, i.e., ILN.  This extreme case presents the opposite 
case to that in Figure 3A.1.  Here the local representative has chosen to spend sufficiently on 
the grant-aided policy initially to prevent the conditions of the closed matching grant from 
crowding out any possible grant-aided policy experimentation. 
 
Figure 3A.2:  No Crowding Out of Experimentation 
 
 
The two extreme cases show that the amount of learning that can be crowded out by the 
conditions attached to a grant depends on how the local representative chooses to spend 
portion of the community budget that excludes the grant.  Thus, an intergovernmental grant 
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can effectively impose implicit conditions on the rest of the local community’s budget, such 
as influencing the initial point of local governments spending, I. 
  
92 
 
Appendix 3B 
The Process of Policy Adoption 
 
3B.1 Replication of a Policy 
Consider two policy options in a federation, policy P, which is the existing policy, and policy 
N, which is a new policy innovation developed by an innovator local government.  Let z(<) 
be number of local governments that have implemented P (i.e., the frequency of policy P) and 
ℎ(<) be the number of local governments that have implemented policy N (i.e., the frequency 
of policy N). 
Every local government has chosen either P or N, such that z(<) + ℎ(<) = 1.  Policy P is 
copied by local governments at a rate J and Policy N is copied by local governments at rate 
D, with J ≠ D.  Thus, the system of equations that represents the growth of the two policies 
is: 
z` = z(J − |),         (B.14) 
ℎ` = ℎ(D − |),         (B.2) 
where | = Jz + Dℎ is the average fitness of both policies in the federation, which can be 
thought of as the average number of local governments in the federation that have chosen to 
adopt P or N. 
Given z(<) + ℎ(<) = 1 and | = Jz + Dℎ the system of equations (Equations B.1 and 
B.2) can reduce to a single equation, 
z` = z(1 − z)(J − D),        (B.15) 
which has two equilibria.  The first equilibrium is when z = 0 and the second equilibrium is 
when z = 1.  For the first, if z = 0, policy P is replaced entirely by policy N in the 
federation.  For the second, if z = 1, then policy P replaces any instances of policy N in the 
federation, meaning that N never gets adopted.   
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Additionally, if J > D, then z` > 0 for all z ∈ (0,1). Thus, for a federation consisting of 
some local governments using policy P and others using policy N, the number of local 
governments using P will increase as the rate at which P is copied by other local governments 
exceeds the rate at which N is being adopted by local governments.  Similarly if D > J, 
ℎ` > 0 for all ℎ ∈ (0,1). Thus, again, for a federation consisting of some local governments 
using policy P and others using policy N, the number of local governments using N will 
increase as the rate at which N is adopted by local governments exceeds the rate at which N is 
being adopted by local governments.   
 
3B.2 Replication with Mutation 
Policy mutation can be defined as “unplanned policy experimentation that arises along the 
margins of existing policies” (Rodrik 2014:203), e.g., when a policy cannot be imitated 
perfectly by adopter government.  Consider policy P which is the existing policy and policy 
M which is what policy P mutates into.  Let z(<) be number of local governments that have 
implemented P (i.e., frequency of policy P) and ℎ(<) be the number of local governments that 
have implemented policy M.  Every local government has chosen either P or M, such that 
z(<) + ℎ(<) = 1.  The mutation rate from P to M is }.  Thus, the system of equations that 
represents the growth of the two policies is: 
z` = z(1 − }) − |z,         (B.16) 
ℎ` = ℎ} + ℎ − |ℎ.         (B.5) 
Assume both P and M have the same fitness, J = s = 1 and average fitness, |, is also  
| = 1.  Given z(<) + ℎ(<) = 1, we can simplify the system of equations to: 
z` = −z}          (B.6) 
Thus, the frequency of policy N declines over time as: 
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z(<) = zy:
~
 .        (B.7) 
The frequency of B increases as: 
ℎ(<) = 1 − (1 − ℎy):
~
.        (B.17) 
Since this shows mutation only from N to M, and not the other way around, policy N will 
eventually be phased out and M will become the policy of choice. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Conclusion  
 
4.1 Summary and Conclusion  
This thesis shows that the economics of organisation can add to the political economy study 
of the boundary of the state and of the internal organisation of government. It begins by 
investigating the problem of the economic organisation of the public sector, and, in particular, 
two related issues that are central to the thesis: the boundary of the state and the internal 
organisation of government.  
Chapter 2 considers the boundary of the state as a parallel problem to the boundary of the 
firm (cf. Wittman 1991 and Bolton, Roland and Spolaore 1996).  To do so it takes a broader 
view of the state in which the state is bounded in terms of social space rather than physical 
space.  By doing so, it builds on the North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) framework in which 
the state is seen as an organisation of organisations.  The framework is extended to include 
the formation of new natural states from existing ones via internal exit.  
Specifically, Chapter 2 uses a model to economically capture the birth of a new state 
through boundary change.  It extends Buchanan and Faith’s (1987) theory of internal exit by 
providing a model in which internal exit is initiated by public revenue surplus sharing elite 
members.  While Buchanan and Faith’s theory predicts an internal exit-proof tax rate, as this 
thesis shows, in precolonial southern Africa (ca. 1600-1910), internal exit is not always 
preventable.  In fact, internal exit has left a legacy in the form of the Ndebele people who 
originated from the Ndebele state that started when Mzilikazi (together with people loyal to 
him) left the Zulu 19th century formed his own, new state.   
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The historically informed model in Chapter 2 provides a political economy explanation of 
why internal exit took place in precolonial southern Africa.  The model shows how internal 
exit results from the payoff calculation of an elite member’s (e.g., Mzilikazi) desire to 
maximise his share of public revenue surplus.   As in the political economy literature (e.g., 
Friedman 1977; Wittman 1991; Findlay 1996; Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 2005) Chapter 2 
provides a boundary condition for the state.  However, because of the unique African 
conditions (e.g., the institution of birthright), the boundary condition concerns the size of the 
elite and the ability to raise a public revenue surplus rather than other factors more commonly 
emphasised in the literature (costs of public goods, political costs of heterogenous 
populations, etc.).  The model shows that an African state boundary is determined by the 
ability of the ruler to provide each elite member with a sufficient public revenue surplus share 
(i.e., a certainty equivalent of exit) to remove the incentive to exit. 
Chapter 3 considers the internal organisation of government in the context of the SGT of 
fiscal federalism.  It submits that an intergovernmental grant can be viewed as the public 
economics counterpart to an incomplete contract (Brennan and Pincus 1990).  More 
specifically, it provides a role for intergovernmental grants in the context of laboratory 
federalism. Very little theory has been produced that ties policy experimentation with grants.  
By taking an organisational view of intergovernmental grants by likening them to incomplete 
contracts, it shows that grants can be instruments for the creation and discovery of new 
knowledge in the public sector (cf. Garzarelli 2006).    
Accordingly, Chapter 3 introduces a model to show how intergovernmental grants can be 
used to stimulate local policy experimentation.  It is an evolutionary learning model that 
captures the knowledge gains that different types of grants-as-contracts can engender.  The 
model proxies the undertaking of different policy experiments by the local government 
representative using an intergovernmental grant with melioration (Herrnstein and Prelec 
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1991; Herrnstein et al. 1993; Metcalfe 2001).  Melioration is able to capture the trial-and-
error process of local government learning.  Through experimentation with an 
intergovernmental grant, the local government representative, behaving as a meliorator, 
engages in different policy experiments, ultimately allocating more of the grant funding to the 
policy experiment that proves most successful.  Moreover, as a meliorator, the local 
government representative will also put a stop to any policy experiments that prove 
unsuccessful.  
Ultimately, the model shows that a lump-sum grant allows a local government 
representative more freedom to experiment than a closed matching grant.  Moreover, the 
model shows that the conditions attached to the closed matching grant can actually crowd out 
potential policy experimentation. 
 
4.2 Areas for Future Research 
As this thesis is largely theoretical, even though historically and factually well-grounded, an 
area for future research is to investigate the empirical implications of the theoretical results.  
In terms of the boundaries of precolonial southern African states it will be useful to 
corroborate the results of this model with any available data.  This may prove challenging 
because, as we saw, the states under consideration are preliterate. 
As for the implications of Chapter 3, it will be useful to test the efficacy of different types 
of intergovernmental grants in promoting local government experimentation.  Specifically, it 
would be useful to test empirically whether a lump-sum grant induces greater 
experimentation by the grant recipient than a closed matching grant. 
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